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Aber rühmen wir nicht nur den Weisen 
Dessen Namen auf dem Buche prangt! 
Denn man muß dem Weisen seine Weisheit erst entreißen. 
Darum sei der Zöllner auch bedankt: 
Er hat sie ihm abverlangt. 
 
 
Bertold Brecht, Legende von der Entstehung des Buches 
Taoteking auf dem Weg des Laotse in die Emigration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But the honour should not be restricted  
To the sage whose name is clearly writ. 
For a wise man’s wisdom needs to be extracted. 
So the customs man deserves his bit. 
It was he who called for it. 
 
 
Bertold Brecht, Legend of the origin of the book 
Tao-te-ching on Lao-tsu’s road into exile 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Motivation for restructuring 
 
  Historically, the electricity industry was a monopoly industry with a vertical structure. 
In a vertically integrated environment, enterprises were responsible for the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electrical power in a given geographical area. Such 
companies could be state owned as well as private. But the last two decades, and 
especially during the 1990s, the electricity supply service has been undergoing a drastic 
reform all over the world. The old monopolist power markets are replaced with 
deregulated electricity markets open to the competition. Different forces have driven the 
power market towards the deregulation. Not all of them are behind the reform in all 
these countries. Furthermore, in each different country the same reason has to be studied 
taking into consideration the local circumstances. However, it is possible to categorize 
all these various causes in technical, economical and political.   
  The technological development of high voltage networks during the 1960s and 1970s 
made possible transmission of bulk power over long distances. This is a necessary 
condition in order the power market to be opened to producers that are located far from 
the main customers [1]. Despite this achievement the electricity industry remained a 
monopoly for the next twenty years.  
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  So, there is another technical factor which has given a stronger impulse towards the 
deregulation. This factor is the improved power generation technologies. In 1960s and 
1970s the typical size of thermal power plant units was between 600 and 1000 MW. 
The average construction time for such power plants was four to five years. In case of 
nuclear power plant this time was double. For this reason, the decisions of generation 
expansion could be taken only by a monopolist utility so as to make the necessary 
investments. The monopolist regime was also acting as protection against investment 
errors which could have dramatic consequences because of the investment size. The 
development of gas power plants, and especially of combined circle gas turbines, led to 
an optimal size of power production unit up to 300 MW. Besides the reduction in the 
investment cost, the construction time of such power plants is essentially shorter than it 
was before. Hence, it is now possible the generation expansion decisions to be taken by 
smaller enterprises [2]. The expansion of gas network is an additional reason that makes 
investments in gas power plants easily realisable.  
  Another mixed technical-ecological cause is the inclination of modern society for an 
increase in power produced by renewable sources. The emerging of independent 
producers who operate, mostly, wind power units gives a further competitive character 
to the power industry despite the fact that such producers survive still due to the 
subsidies.  
  The improvement of transmission technologies result in an efficient grid operated by 
the transmission companies. Devices such as FACTS enable a better control over the 
electrical features of the grid. Thus, the separation of generation and transmission 
decisions can be easier.  
  Beyond the technical improvements, a set of economical reasons may be considered as 
the main force behind the electricity market reform. The key economical idea, which led 
to the deregulation, was that a well operated competitive market can guarantee both cost 
minimization and average energy prices hold at a minimum level [1]. The economists 
believe that an open market provides stronger incentives to the supplier in order to 
apply cost-minimizing procedures than a regulated market. The second positive 
characteristic of a competitive market is its ability to drive the prices towards the 
marginal costs. Of course, in order this advantage to appear the market has to be well 
designed.  
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  Another economical reason was the inability of countries with high national debt to 
meet the necessary investments in state owned power sector [3]. So, the only solution 
for these countries was the privatisation of the electricity industry. Through this process 
these countries achieved two objectives. Firstly, to free up public funds and make them 
available to serve the national debt or other demands. Secondly, the governments of 
these countries collected an essential amount from the sale of state owned utilities.  
  The third category of electricity industry restructure causes consists of political factors. 
The first deregulated power markets have acted as an example showing that the 
electricity sector can also be operated in a competitive environment [4]. Thus, it was 
easier for many countries to overcome hesitation and reform their electricity markets. 
  The liberalisation in USA of many economical sectors in 1970s such as transportation, 
gas and telecommunications was a sign that the power sector would also be reformed. 
The acceptance of open market mode in some economic sectors by the most 
governments world-wide was a further factor which enabled the restructuring. In 1980s, 
the social-democratic governments in many countries have accepted the introduction of 
competition in many economic sectors as a development tool. Among the political 
circles, the idea that the private companies apply more efficient practices than the public 
ones, in certain economic sectors, was getting more acceptance. Hence, the deregulation 
of power market was made possible in many countries. A further reason, which led to 
the deregulation, is the pressure of some multilateral organizations such as World Bank. 
These organizations set as a requirement the opening of markets including the power 
sector in order to support financially a country. Consequently, the electricity industry of 
many countries financed by the World Bank opened to the competition.  
 
1.2 Historical evolution of market deregulation 
 
1.2.1 The deregulation process worldwide 
 
  The first experiences of electricity market in USA, end of 19th century, were 
characterized by a competition without rules [1]. After this brachychronic phase, the 
power industry had been regulated in order to enforce the technology development and 
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to stabilize the market. The first step towards the opening of electricity market was the 
adoption of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act by US government in 1978. This Act 
ordered the utilities to purchase power from particular independent producers. In 1992, 
the Energy Policy Act provided the power to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) so as to require from the utilities transmission services for the wholesale 
customers. The real phase of deregulation in USA started in 1996 when FERC issued 
two directives. The first directive, ‘‘Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open 
Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities’’, demands all 
public utilities to provide non-discriminatory open access transmission services [5]. The 
second directive demands the utilities to develop an Internet-based system, that will 
enable the exchange of information about the transfer capacity on transmission lines. 
The power market deregulation has followed different paths in the numerous states 
which have their own separate markets. An additional reason for the different kind of 
development is the absence of jurisdiction by the side of FERC over the entire territory 
of USA. Generally, the wholesale market, in all states, is under the supervision of FERC 
while the competitive retail power markets remain a subject of the individual state 
regulatory commissions.  
  The electricity market of PJM with an installed capacity of more than 67000 MW is 
one of the largest fully liberalised markets in USA [6]. PJM came online in 1997 as a 
regional bid-based energy market. At that time its members were 89 while at the end of 
2002 PJM counted more than 200 members. In spite of the successful operation of PJM, 
the most known case of power market liberalisation is the one of California. The initial 
euphoria of the first two years, after the market deregulation, was followed by 
problematic situations for all the market participants. The highlight of these problems 
was the blackouts that happened in California during 2001 and the bankruptcy of some 
wholesale companies which were involved in the market. A certain cause for this 
unsuccessful market performance was that the retail prices remained low due to 
regulatory orders while the wholesale prices were increasing dramatically. So, the 
wholesale distributors could not meet the demand. The transmission capacity shortage 
was another reason. That resulted in market power exercised by few sellers during 
network congestion situations [7, 8]. The paradigm of California teaches how a 
mediocre deregulation may result in significant problems. The epulosis process in 
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California’s market started in short time, after the problems have been experienced, by 
adopting rules that facilitate a non- problematic market performance.  
  The most recent evolution in USA’s electricity industry is the desire of FERC for the 
introduction of a standard market design (SMD) by all the deregulated markets [9]. The 
SMD should result in common transmission rules over all the states. Thereby the power 
trading by market participants who aim to transport power across different states will be 
simplified. Optimal economic performance should also be achieved through the 
adoption of SMD as a result of higher transmission efficiency.  
  Chronologically, the first deregulated electricity market world-wide was the one of 
Chile. As early as 1982 Chile introduced competition into power industry by giving the 
right to large end users to choose their supplier and negotiate the prices. Beyond this 
first step Chile realized later explicit market mechanisms in order to determine the 
generators’ dispatch and the wholesale electricity price [10]. Thus, competition among 
the producers arose. In the case of Chile a non democratic regime imposed in a very 
short period such a drastic change as the reform of electricity sector. Comparatively, the 
most mature industrialized country, USA, needed almost two decades to transform the 
power sector. The experiment with Chile’s deregulation was successful and so 
Argentina in 1992 opened its market in competition followed by Peru in 1993, Bolivia 
and Colombia in 1994 and the countries of Central America in 1997. Brazil is joining 
also the group of countries which have restructured their power industry. However, in 
the case of Brazil certain problems emerged concerning the privatisation of distribution 
companies. Generally, the deregulation in Latin America has led to an essential improve 
of power sector. The current trend in this area is the development of electricity markets 
covering large parts of the continent beyond the countries’ borders [11].  
  The power sector restructuring in Oceania has also a long history. In 1987, the 
government of New Zealand began the reform of power sector by setting up the 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ). The task of ECNZ was to own and 
operate the facilities of the Ministry of Energy. In 1988, the system operator, 
Transpower, was set up by ECNZ. After some years of initial restructuring, a voluntary 
wholesale electricity market was founded in New Zealand. Its performance to date 
brings the New Zealand’s market among the most successful paradigms of power sector 
deregulation. The most present issue is the introduction of the financial transmission 
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rights as a tool for hedging transmission congestion costs and giving incentives for grid 
expansion investments [12]. In neighbouring Australia, the Industry Commission 
recommended reforms that included the state-owned electricity industry, in 1990. In 
1994, in the state of Victoria a pool market was established. The same market form was 
introduced in New South Wales in 1996. These two markets were the founders of 
National Electricity Market of Australia in 1998. As key achievement of Australia’s 
electricity market may be considered the implementation of a wholesale spot market. 
The next step of the reform process is the replacement of the present mixed federal and 
state regulatory structure with a national energy regulator [13].  
  The electricity market has undergone a reform in some countries of Asia too. The most 
economic powerful country of the region, Japan, started a restructuring process in 1995. 
The introduction of competition was achieved by promoting the entry of independent 
power producers into the wholesale market [14]. These producers were eligible to bid 
only in service areas outside from the area where they were located. Japan is divided in 
10 zones operated by private vertically integrated companies. Since that time no many 
changes have taken place in Japan’s power sector. However, in February 2003 the 
Electric Industry Committee has issued a directive demanding the establishment of a 
Power Exchange. Furthermore, consumers with demand more than 50 kW will be able 
to choose their supplier from April 2005 [15]. In China, despite the central controlled 
economy, the power sector has experienced a reform since mid-1980s. In first phase, 
private investment in generation has been allowed. In 2002, all the state-owned energy 
enterprises were transformed in commercial companies. However, there are no eligible 
consumers yet. The World Bank supports financially the government’s five-year plan, 
from 2001 to 2005, in restructuring the electricity industry [16]. In India, some states 
have launched a power sector deregulation in mid-1990s. With more than 15% of 
population still not connected to the central grid the objectives of deregulation are rather 
different in India from the rest of the world. First of all, the reform targets to make 
electricity accessible for each household [17]. A further aim is the reduction of power 
supply cost and the increase of electricity services quality. The later should be achieved 
through improved operational efficiency and good governance of electricity industry. 
  In Africa, some countries have begun a restructure process concerning their electricity 
industry. In particular, the countries of northern Africa participate together with 
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members of European Union to build up the Mediterranean Electric Ring, an electric 
network around all the countries of Mediterranean region. In 1999, the government of 
Nigeria adopted a comprehensive privatisation program which should be completed in 
2004. Deregulation of the state-owned electricity industry is planned for the third phase 
of this program [18]. In South Africa, the regulated electricity supply industry has 
performed well to date. However, the government has planned the deregulation of 
power sector. The main concern which drives the reform is to avoid the over-investment 
in capacity expansion, something that happened in the past [19].  
 
1.2.2 The deregulation process in Europe 
 
  In European continent, England started up the procedure of electricity industry 
restructure. In 1989 the parliament adopted the Electricity Act inaugurating a sweeping 
deregulation and privatisation of power sector. The following year, the new electricity 
industry came to being. Its operation mode was a mandatory pool market. In 1994 
consumers with demand more than 100 MW became eligible to participate to the 
market. In 1998 the deregulation degree reached the full 100% by including all 
segments of the electricity market. The pool market was replaced in England and Wales 
in 2001 with a market based on the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). 
The pool market was criticized, despite its good performance, to be exposed in market 
power by side of large suppliers. Furthermore, the mandatory character of the pool was 
not giving the opportunity for bilateral contracts. The new market emerged by adoption 
of NETA tries to treat electricity as far as possible like any other commercial 
commodity [20]. Bilateral contracts are possible parallel to a voluntary pool market. A 
more flexible governance arrangement is also introduced in order to enable on time 
market changes whenever it is necessary.  
  At the same time, the second country next to England, which restructured its electricity 
market towards deregulation, is Norway. The beginning of deregulation was in 1990 by 
adopting the Energy Act. In 1995, the Swedish market was also reformed and together 
with the Norwegian electricity market established the Nord Pool which launched in 
early 1996 [21]. This is a power market, which includes both bilateral and voluntary 
pool modes. Thereby, it has avoided the non-flexibility of England’s initial pool market. 
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Finland became a member of Nord Pool in 1998 followed by West Denmark in 1999 
and finally the East Denmark in year 2000. The performance of Nord Pool brings it 
among the most successful paradigms of electricity sector deregulation.  
  In Russia public discussions about the power sector reform have started in the last 
years. A certain problem will be the rise of end consumer’s price up to 300% when the 
subsidies of electricity price come to an end [22]. Moreover, the coordination of 
Russian giant network in a deregulated environment by itself is another challenge. 
  In European Union, with the exception of United Kingdom, the deregulation of 
electricity industry has been launched in 1996 by the adoption of Electricity Directive 
96/92/EC [23]. This was the result of many years’ negotiations between the member 
countries. The directive sets some thresholds for the progressive opening of the power 
sector. The final deadline is July 2007 when the electricity markets of all current 
member countries have to be fully deregulated. However, the directive does not define a 
common guideline for the electricity industry reform. Therefore, the restructure process 
has followed many different paths between the member countries.  
  In Germany, the adoption of Electrical Economy Right New Regulation Law signalled 
the power sector deregulation, in 1998. The German market was fully opened, in 100 %, 
i.e. the end-consumers are able to choose their supplier. The three Association 
Agreements between the energy producers and industrial consumers defined the 
framework for the calculation of transmission tariffs [24-26]. A particular characteristic 
of German electricity market is the absence of a regulator authority. The Cartel Office 
replaces some of the functions that a regulator would have. Taking the price reduction 
as criterion, one may describe the electricity industry deregulation as successful because 
both industrial and residential consumers have faced essential price reductions after the 
market opening.  
  In contrast to Germany, the power sector of France remains regulated and dominated 
in a high degree by the state-owned Electricité de France. In summer 2003 only a 35% 
of market volume was opened to competition. That corresponds to consumers with more 
than 7 GWh demand yearly. The situation in the rest countries of the European Union is 
a mirror of the two above paradigms. From the one side is Greece where the electricity 
market is opened up to 35% while the power market in Spain is already fully 
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deregulated. The present situation in European countries, regarding the electricity 
market opening, is illustrated in Figure 1.1 [34]. 
 
 
 
 
 
10%-35%               40%-70%               100%      
Figure 1.1 Electricity market opening in Europe, July 2003 
 
  Despite the different forms that the deregulation has taken in member countries, the 
final aim of European Union is to build up the Internal Market of Electricity (IEM) as a 
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Pan European single market for the commodity of electricity [27]. The IEM will 
contribute to the achievement of the aims that European Union has set concerning the 
electricity industry. The first aim is the increase of competitiveness by better service for 
consumers. The second aim, persuaded by European Union, is a better environmental 
protection and ultimately greater security for power supplies. In order to deal with the 
task of setting up the Internal Market, European Union has founded the Florence 
Regulatory Forum [28]. The Florence Forum focuses on three regulatory issues that are 
necessary for the development of IEM. The first point is the definition of a framework 
for the cross-border power trade. Furthermore, the Florence Forum has to set up rules 
for the use of transmission capacity in case of congestions. Finally, the development of 
procedures, which will lead to the increase of interconnections’ capacity, is another 
important task of Florence Forum. 
 
1.3 Deregulated electricity market structure 
 
  The anatomy of deregulated power markets worldwide shows that the reform process 
has taken a number of different forms in various countries. Economic and political 
reasons, due to local conditions, have led to the adoption of different paradigms by the 
market restructure. However, there is a common basis and some similar characteristics 
that can be found to all of the competitive electricity markets.  
  A first characteristic is that, generally, the generation, transmission and distribution 
services are the responsibilities of different companies. This unbundling of services 
results in a deregulated electricity market. The transform process as well as the period 
after transformation is supervised by a regulatory authority. The task of this authority is 
to set up the general guidelines under which the market will operate. After the 
restructure, the task of the regulatory body focuses on the performance of the market. 
Although some markets, as in Germany, operate without regulatory authority, this is 
rather exception than a rule.  
  In the restructured market, the power generation is a competitive sector, which is 
qualified generation companies are able to take part in the market and sell their 
production. A very important principle of deregulated electricity market is the non-
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discrimination. According to this principle, all producers and consumers, holding some 
certain conditions, must have open and fair access to the network.  
  While the generation is competitive the transmission remains a monopoly. The huge 
cost of investing in transmission network as well as ecological reasons does not allow 
the transform of this service into a competitive market. In order to ensure the open and 
fair access, the grid is operated by an Independent System Operator (ISO). The 
spectrum of ISO’s responsibilities is quite wide [29]. The ISO has the responsibility to 
make available information regarding the network, such as the Available Transfer 
Capability, for all market participants. Moreover, its task comprises the real time 
operation of the network. This operation consists of adjusting network situation and, if 
necessary, ordering of the ancillary services so as to keep the system balance. Some of 
the ancillary service may be obtained through a balancing market where the participants 
submit their bids for increase/decrease their power in case of balancing operations.  
  Another characteristic, which is a case in matured deregulated markets, is the 
numerous contracts that hedge the risk resulting by the fluctuation of electricity prices. 
The market participants have the opportunity to purchase such contracts from ISO or 
from the regulatory authority. Furthermore, a secondary market can be organized where 
these contracts are traded as any other commodity.  
  The above described characteristics are common in the different types of deregulated 
market. Two basic market forms, the bilateral contract market and the pool market, are 
the common ground where the different types of markets are developed on. Besides 
these two types, a third alternative, based on multilateral agreements between the 
market participants, has been proposed [48].  
  In the bilateral market, producers and consumers directly negotiate the price and the 
quantity of traded energy. The transaction agents submit their schedule to the ISO 
requesting for permission to carry out the transaction. If the system balance is not 
endangered by this transaction then the ISO is committed to accept the schedule. If the 
transaction is accepted the ISO requires from the transaction agents to cover the 
associated transaction losses either by payment or by providing the necessary power. 
Furthermore, the ISO bills the transaction agents for using the network. 
  In a pool market, there is no direct contact between producers and consumers. The 
ISO, or a Pool Operator if one exists, collects one day in advance the bids for power sell 
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or purchase from the market participants. Then generators and loads are dispatched in 
such a way that leads to the economic optimum, i.e. the minimization of costs. 
  The majority of the deregulated markets are designed to include both two basic market 
forms. So, while a direct trading between consumer and producers is possible, the 
market participants can take part in the spot market where energy is traded as in a pool 
market [30]. The experience to date evidences that markets, that offer to their 
participants the flexibility to choose between bilateral contracts and spot market, have 
the best performance.  
  The entities that participate in the deregulated electricity markets include the 
generation companies or other commercial enterprises which can inject power into the 
network and they are described as suppliers. The side of consumers is represented by 
the distribution companies, the retail traders or directly by the end-consumers. In Figure 
1.2 a general form of deregulated electricity market is illustrated. 
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1.4 Objectives 
 
  The scope of this work is the analysis of the costs that are associated with the power 
transfer as well as the realisation of new methods and tools concerning the calculation 
and the allocation of these costs.  
  The power transmission costs, which are charged to the market participants, are a 
central issue of the new cosmos of deregulated electricity markets. The increased 
requirement for fair and transparent pricing in the competitive environment as well as 
the complexity introduced by unbundling the services point out why this issue is of 
great importance [31].  
  In general, the costs associated with the power transfer may be categorized as follows: 
• Cost associated with the power losses. 
• Cost caused by system congestion. 
• Fixed cost of the power system 
• Cost of ancillary services. 
In the deregulated electricity market, the participants are obliged to cover the power 
losses either by providing the necessary power or paying for the losses. The second 
category comprises the costs that are emerged when some technical features of the 
network reach their operational limits. In this case, the market equilibrium is different 
than the ideal optimum. The costs associated with this deviation are known as 
congestion costs. The fixed cost refers to the networks’ investment and maintenance 
cost which is collected by the ISO. 
  The last category comprises the expenditures for the appropriate power system 
performance. In order to operate the network in a proper way, the ISO has to ensure the 
procurement of the so-called ancillary services [32, 33]. Although that these services 
vary between the different types of electricity markets, the following list illustrates the 
most common of them: 
• Real power balance 
• Voltage support 
• Spinning reserves 
• Non-spinning reserves 
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• Back start 
  The real power balance is directly associated with the frequency control. In order to 
avoid significant problems, the network frequency must be maintained, with very small 
deviation, at the nominal value. For the voltage wider deviations from the nominal value 
are permitted. However, there are also some limits that have to be kept. So, in case of 
higher deviation, a voltage support action is necessary. The spinning reserves are 
resource capacities synchronized to the network that can supply energy or reduce 
demand within a certain time, usually 10 minutes. The non-spinning reserves are similar 
to the previous ones with the exception that they are not necessarily synchronized to the 
network. The black start is the capability of some generators to start up without being 
fed from the network. In case of large failures, generators possessing black start 
capability are necessary to start again the grid.  
  The largest part of power transmission cost consists of charges in order to recover the 
network fixed cost. The congestion cost may also be significant part of the power 
transmission cost depending on the nature of congestion. Therefore, this work is 
focused on these two components of transmission costs. Within the framework of this 
work, these two different kinds of costs have been analysed. New methods and tools 
concerning the calculation and allocation of these costs have also been realised.  
 
1.5 Outline 
 
  The organization of this work is as follows. In Chapter 2, first the definition of system 
congestions is presented as well as the analysis of different congestion management 
methods. Then, the analytical paradigm of pool market is described followed by the 
analysis of both nodal prices and their components that will be used as a framework in 
this dissertation. This followed by a new method which links the congestion costs to the 
market participants. In addition, some studies on the market participants’ behaviour are 
presented and their influences on the network situation. 
  In Chapter 3, the effectiveness of this research work is demonstrated by analysing the 
operation mode of Norwegian electricity market. In particular, the market operation 
under the use of DC optimal power flow and zonal pricing is investigated. Comparisons 
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are made between the real AC situation and the DC market approximation. Moreover, a 
new method is presented for realisation of zonal pricing.  
  In Chapter 4, the problem of the network fixed cost is considered. In this framework, 
the game theory has been used to calculate and allocate these costs. Different game 
theoretical methods are analysed and the features of the cost allocation game are 
illustrated. Additionally, a new framework combining already known methods and the 
game theory is presented. 
  In Chapter 5, the conclusions of this research work can be found. Moreover, some 
suggestions on the extensions to potential topics for future research are presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Congestion management in 
nodal pricing market 
 
 
 
2.1 Congestions in electricity networks 
 
  Electrical power networks are generally complicated systems consisting of numerous 
facilities and equipment. Generators, transmission as well as distribution lines and 
transformers are the main of them. All of these equipments are designed to operate 
between some certain limits. Additionally, the electrical features of a power system 
must be kept between the given values so as the system to operate without problem. 
Such features are the voltage magnitude of system buses and the difference of voltage 
angle at the beginning and the end of a transmission line. These electrical characteristics 
should not violate certain limits so as the power system to maintain a harmonious 
performance.  
  When any of the various system constraints reaches, or exceeds, its operational limits, 
then the resulting operational situation is defined as congestion. The most important 
constraints, regarding the economic performance of the system, are the thermal limits of 
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lines and transformers as well as the voltage magnitude constraints. The latter becomes 
rarely of great significance. Stability limits, based on the voltage angle difference, may 
become also economic critical in case of long transmission lines as they lead to 
reduction of allowable power flow. 
  Power flow causes energy losses in the form of heat through transmission lines and 
transformers. The material, from which lines are made of, has physical melt limit. When 
line temperature reaches this limit then the material melts and the line breaks. Hence, 
the power flow over a line must not increase the line temperature cross this limit. The 
different climate conditions that a line experiences during the seasons result in different 
power flow limits. Thus, the values of line power flow constraints should be considered 
in relation to the climate conditions. Transformers may be loaded over their nominal 
value for long periods without having operational problems. However, transformer 
power flow must hold certain limits too. 
 
2.2 Electricity pool market 
 
  One of the two basic types of deregulated power markets is the pool market. The pool 
model is based on a centralized arrangement in order to achieve the optimal economic 
performance of the market.  
  The history of central network dispatch aiming at an economic optimum dates back to 
early 1920s or even earlier when engineers already concerned themselves with the 
problem of economic allocation of generation [35]. Since 1930s the equal incremental 
cost method was favoured as the most efficient. Economic dispatch considers only real 
power generations and represents the electrical network by a single equality constraint, 
the power balance equation. In early 1960s the first methods of optimal power flow 
(OPF) were developed [36]. These methods treated the entire network in an exact 
manner. The objective function of the OPF methods was the minimization either of the 
generation costs or of the active power losses.  
  Nowadays the most well-known electricity pool markets are established in New 
Zealand, Australia, the Scandinavian countries (Nord Pool) and in eastern part of USA 
(PJM). The main characteristic of electricity pool market is that the power is traded 
through the market and not directly between producers and consumers. The market is 
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operated either by a separate Pool Operator or directly by the Independent System 
Operator. The task of market operator is to lead the pool market to a short-run economic 
optimum.  
  In order to achieve this aim, the market operator collects the electric power bids from 
suppliers as well as from consumers. The bids are related to a certain time interval, 
usually half or one hour, and they are submitted to the ISO a day before the applicability 
of the time [6]. Therefore, the modern pool markets are also known as a day ahead 
markets. When the bids are submitted, the market operator runs an OPF program taking 
into consideration the network constraints. The objective of this OPF program is to 
minimize the total costs also known as social welfare. The OPF calculates spot prices 
for each location (bus) of the grid as well as the quantity of power that is to be supplied 
or bought by each of the market participant. Consumers and suppliers are then billed to 
the spot price of their bus for the corresponding amount of power [37]. In some pool 
markets, such as the Nord Pool, there is no locational pricing and the bid mechanism is 
used to calculate a global, or sometimes zonal, market clearing price. In the following 
day if there is a difference between calculated schedule and real generation or demand 
then this difference is covered through the real time (balancing) market. A schematic 
description of pool market operation is given by Figure 2.1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Electricity pool market 
 
  In the monopoly power markets the utility was performing an OPF knowing the real 
cost data of its generators. Furthermore, the load was also given and had to be fully 
covered. In the present deregulated market, the pool operator has no knowledge about 
the cost functions of power plants owned by the producers. Moreover, the wholesale 
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consumers are eligible to vary their demand according to the price that they face. 
Consequently, the market operator runs the OPF based on the bids collected from the 
market participants. In Figure 2.2, typical suppliers’ as well as consumer’s bid curves 
are illustrated. The supply bid curve shows the minimum price at which a supplier 
wants to sell a certain quantity of power. If the price is less than 1p  then the supplier 
sells nothing to the pool market. In contrast, when the price is higher than 3p , the 
supplier has the willingness to offer up to his maximum capacity. On the other hand, the 
demand bid curve shows the maximum acceptable price at which the consumer is 
willing to buy a certain quantity of power. If the electricity price faced by the consumer 
is more than 3p  then his demand is zero. When the price falls down from 1p  then the 
consumer may purchase a power amount up to his maximal demand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Supplier (left) and consumer (right) bid curves 
 
2.3 The optimal power flow problem 
 
  The Pool Operator, the day before the corresponding time interval, feeds an optimal 
power flow program with the bids collected from the market participants. Generally, 
optimisation problems aim to maximise or minimise a function while certain restrictions 
hold.  
  In the deregulated pool market, the optimisation problem has to serve a double task. 
First, it aims to minimise the power supply costs. At the same time the other objective 
of optimisation is to cover the load demand as much as possible. The more power the 
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[€/MWh] [€/MWh]p p
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2p
1p
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consumers take the more profit they have through the use of power. So, if the 
consumers’ full demand is not covered that results in profit losses which can be seen as 
a kind of cost. Thus, the objective function of the OPF is called social welfare because it 
aims to minimise the global system costs and thereby to maximise the profit of all 
market participants. Assuming for simplicity one step bid curves for both generators and 
loads, the objective function has the following form: 
 
  UL
T
G
T
ULGK PpPpPP maxmin),( +=  (2.1) 
 
where 
K: the social welfare 
GP : vector of generation power 
ULP : vector of uncovered load portion 
minp : vector of minimum acceptable price(bid) from generators 
maxp : vector of maximum acceptable price(bid) from loads 
 
A part of a particular load is not served if the load bid for this part is lower than the 
suppliers’ bid or if system congestions do not allow the cover of this part of demand. 
Each uncovered load portion can be modelled through a fictitious generator [38]. From 
the consumer bid curve of Figure 2.2 the bid curve of fictitious generator can be defined 
as in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Bid curve of fictitious consumer generator 
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  Figure 2.3 shows that a part of fictitious generator is dispatched if the corresponding 
bid price is lower than the suppliers’ bid. It is also possible this generator to be 
dispatched if system congestions prevent the full cover of the load. For a load located at 
bus i  it can be written: 
 
  iULi PP max0 ≤≤  (2.2a) 
  ULiiLLi PPP −= max  (2.2b) 
 
where 
LiP :  covered load portion at bus i  
iLP max : maximum load demand at bus i  
 
The objective function for the OPF in the Pool market can be now formulated as: 
 
  G
T
GK PpP min)( =  (2.3) 
 
where the new vector GP  includes the fictitious generators. 
  The restrictions of the OPF are with respect to the active and reactive power balance at 
each system node, the line flow constraints, the voltage magnitude limits and the active 
and reactive power generation limits. Thus, the OPF can be formulated as: 
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where 
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LP :  vector of active power load 
),( θVP : vector of nodal active power flow 
GQ :  vector of reactive power generation 
LQ :  vector of reactive power load 
),( θVQ : vector of nodal reactive power flow 
),( θVS . vector of line power flow 
V :  vector of bus voltage magnitude 
θ :   vector of bus voltage angle 
 
It is now possible to give to the OPF a more compact form by grouping together all 
equality restrictions and putting up two groups of the inequality constraints: 
 
 
0QPh
0θVQPg
0θVQPf
P
≤
≤
=
),(
),,,(
),,,(..
)(min
GG
GG
GG
G
ts
K
 (2.5) 
 
where 
),,,( θVQPf GG : set of equality constraints with respect to active and reactive 
power balance 
),,,( θVQPg GG : set of inequality constraints with respect to bus voltage magnitude 
and line power flow 
),( GG QPh : set of inequality constraints with respect to active and reactive 
power generation 
 
For the above optimisation problem, it is easy to formulate a function called Lagrange 
function. This Lagrange function is a sum of the original problem objective function 
and the original problem restriction which is now multiplied by factors called Lagrange 
multipliers. For the above described OPF the Lagrange function is as follows:  
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where 
λ : vector of Lagrange multipliers with respect to set of equality constraints  
),,,( θVQPf GG  
µ : vector of Lagrange multipliers with respect to set of inequality constraints 
),,,( θVQPg GG  
σ : vector of Lagrange multipliers with respect to set of inequality constraints 
),( GG QPh  
 
At the solution point of OPF the gradients of the Lagrange function with respect to any 
problem variable are equal to zero. Thus, solving sets of equations that obtained by the 
gradients with respect to the active and reactive generation one may find out that:  
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where 
τ: vector including the active and reactive power 
 
  Consequently, the vector λ  includes the marginal cost for additional active and 
reactive load at each bus of the power system. In the pool market these marginal costs 
are the nodal prices for active and reactive power at each bus. In order (2.7) to be valid 
for a system bus the only binding restriction related with the bus generation must be the 
bus power balance. In event of any other binding constraint that is related with the bus 
generation the Lagrange multiplier is not equal with the bus marginal cost. 
Consequently, the corresponding nodal price is also not equal to the marginal cost. 
Similarly to vector λ , the vectors µ  and σ  contain the marginal change in cost with 
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respect to the corresponding constraints. The elements iµ  and jσ  of vectors µ  and σ  
respectively are different than zero only in case that the corresponding constraints are 
active. By the solution of OPF the vectors λ , µ  and σ  are calculated and are available 
to the market operator. The nodal prices are then announced to the market participants 
so as to know which quantity of power and at which price they will trade. The Lagrange 
multipliers associated with the system constrains are used by the market operator in 
order to deal with any binding constraints. 
  For the solution of the OPF problem a great variety of methods has been applied. The 
first efficient OPF programs were based on the gradient method [36, 39, 40]. Although 
these methods treat the entire AC network in an exact way they have essential 
disadvantages. The gradients included derivatives, which had quite different magnitudes 
than the derivatives of the objective function. Thus, there was no high acriby by the 
achievement of optimum. The maintaining of constraints was also not satisfactory. In 
the next years methods of linear programming have been developed in order to 
approach closer the exact optimum [41, 42]. The quadratic programming based 
applications is another part of the OPF methods [43, 44]. In [45, 46] a different 
direction was followed by developing programs in the Newton’s form.  
  The different OPF methods may be distinguished in two categories [47]. The first 
category consists of methods that begin the optimisation from an already solved power 
flow. In order to calculate the optimum these methods use the Jacobian as well as other 
sensitivity relations. This is an iterative process where the power flow problem is solved 
at each iteration. The methods that belong to the second category are based on the exact 
optimality conditions while the power flow relations are included as equality 
restrictions. By these methods there is no initial power flow solution. For the methods 
belonging to this category the process is also iterative and the intermediate solutions 
approach the power flow solution.  
  The majority of the first category methods use in their optimisation part either a linear 
programming or a quadratic programming. A significant advantage of these methods is 
the clear and systematic treatment of constraints. Particularly, the linear programming 
has performed a quite efficient operation concerning the active power dispatch. Another 
merit of this category is that the initial point is a solved power flow, which in most 
cases represents a feasible solution of the OPF. On the other hand the disadvantage of 
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the first category methods is that when linear programming is used in order to minimize 
the power losses there is no high acriby by the calculation of optimum. Additionally, a 
disadvantage of the linear programming is that when the generation cost functions are 
similar or identical this method shows very slow convergence rate. 
  The methods of second category based either on Newton algorithm or on a quadratic 
programming when the Lagrangian of the OPF is quadratic. The Quasi-Newton 
applications belong also to this category. These methods have a great benefit of solving 
the OPF in a global way. This fact makes them attractive because they are able to 
calculate exact the optimum. The convergence in the Newton approach is also very 
satisfactory. The major drawback that the methods of this category have is by the 
handling of the inequality constraints and particularly by the determination of the 
binding inequality constraints. The use of sparsity techniques as well as the application 
of ordinary power flow may cope with this problem. 
 
2.4 Analysis of nodal prices 
 
  The nodal prices that are computed through the OPF are influenced by different 
factors. Generally, the basis of nodal prices is the generation or supply cost. 
Additionally, the system power losses result in different, dependent on the location, 
nodal prices. Furthermore, the system congestions are of great significance by the 
computation of nodal prices. The nodal prices are analysed into components because 
each of these component has an economical and physical interpretation. Knowing these 
components the pool operator may apply proper policies so as to achieve an optimal 
market performance. The numerous parts of nodal prices are not always independent 
from each other. The power losses component is associated with the generation 
component. Thus, in the following analysis, these two components are calculated as 
one. The decomposition of nodal prices has been illustrated as early as 1988 in [37]. 
More recent work on this issue may be found in [38, 49, 50]. In following sections the 
nodal prices are analysed into two components using two different methods. 
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2.4.1 General formulation 
 
  The nodal prices, that are included in vector λ  by the solution of OPF, are due to 
generation, losses and congestion. The aim is to divide these prices into a component 
due to generation-losses and a congestion component. For this purpose it is necessary to 
select a bus r  in the system as reference bus. The OPF of (2.5) may now be formulated 
as follow: 
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where 
GrP : active power generation at reference bus r  
GrQ : reactive power generation at reference bus r  
rV : bus voltage magnitude at reference bus r  
rθ : bus voltage angle at reference bus r  
rf : set of equality constraints with respect to active and reactive power balance at 
reference bus r  
 
  It should be emphasized that the vector ),,,,,( θVQPf rrGG V θ  in (2.8) does not 
include the equations of reference bus r . Similarly, the vectors VQP ,, GG  and θ  
do not contain the variables rGrGr VQP ,,  and rθ  of the reference bus r  any more.  
  From (2.8) one may obtain the Lagrange function. The detailed form of this function is 
given in (2.9): 
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where 
rλ : vector of Lagrange multipliers with respect to active and reactive power balance 
at reference bus r  
 
  The vector λ , given in (2.9), does not include the Lagrange multipliers 
corresponding to the active and reactive power balance restrictions at reference bus r . 
From this point the nodal price analysis may follow two different ways. Both of them 
lead to the split up of nodal prices into a generation-losses and a congestion component. 
The first method takes in advance the Kuhn-Tucker theorem while the linearisation 
process as well as the duality feature of optimisation is used in the second method. 
 
2.4.2 Nodal price analysis using the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem 
 
  The first step is the introduction of vector ),,( ,, rrGrGrG,G, VQP θθV,QPx = . Given 
the vector x, (2.9) can be rewritten in a more compact form: 
 
σxhµxgλxfλxfxσµλλx rr )()()()()(),,,,(
TTTT
rKL ++++=  (2.10) 
 
  The Kuhn-Tucker theorem is a generalization of Lagrange multipliers. It is a theorem 
in nonlinear programming. The OPF is a typical nonlinear optimisation problem. 
According to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem at the solution point, where the objective 
function is minimized while all constraints are satisfied, the following condition is 
valid: 
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where  
rλ : vector of nodal prices for active and reactive power at reference bus r . 
λ : vector of nodal prices for active and reactive power at all the system buses 
except reference bus r . 
 
  It is essential to mention that the vectors µλλ ,,r  and σ  as well as all the gradients 
are known from the solution of the OPF of (2.5). The OPF of (2.8) is a rewritten form of 
the (2.5) in order to deal with the task of nodal price analysis. Thus, the solution of (2.5) 
is exactly the solution of (2.8). 
  From (2.11) the gradients with respect to V  and θ  are derived: 
 
 0µxgλxfλxf VVrV =∇+∇+∇ TTTr ))(())(())((  (2.12a) 
 0µxgλxfλxf θθrθ =∇+∇+∇ TTTr ))(())(())((  (2.12b) 
 
  In both (2.12a) and (2.12b) neither gradients of objective function K  nor gradients of 
vector h  are appeared. This may be explained by taking a look at the following 
equation: 
 
 0xhxhxx θVθV =∇=∇=∇=∇ )()()()( KK  (2.13) 
 
  As can be seen the gradients of h with respect to V and θ are zero. Thus, vector h can 
be neglected by the nodal price analysis. One may now solve the system of (2.12a) and 
(2.12b) for the vector λ . In this way it is possible to obtain the two nodal price 
components: 
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  In (2.14) it is shown that the vector λ , which contains the nodal prices for active and 
reactive power for all the system buses except the reference bus, is divided into two 
components. The first part of the right side of (2.14) represents the component GLλ  for 
generation and losses. The system congestions’ influence on nodal price is given by the 
second part of the right side of (2.14). This part is the nodal price congestion component 
Cλ . Hence, it is possible to write that: 
 
 rT
r
T
r
T
T
GL λ
)xf(
)xf(
)xf(
)xf(
λ
θ
V
1
θ
V




∇
∇




∇
∇=
−
)(
)(
)(
)(
 (2.15a) 
 µ
)xg(
)xg(
)xf(
)xf(
λ
θ
V
1
θ
V




∇
∇




∇
∇=
−
T
T
T
T
C
)(
)(
)(
)(
 (2.15b) 
 
and: 
 
 CGL λλλ +=  (2.16) 
 
  It is essential to emphasize that the vector rλ  should contain nodal prices for active 
and reactive power that are only due to generation and losses and not due to congestion 
[38]. For this reason it is important to select a suitable reference bus. For the case of 
pool market the generation bus with the lowest bid and with available capacity is a 
practical choice. Thereby, the local additional load can be served by the generator of 
that bus. 
 
2.4.3 Nodal price analysis using linearisation and the dual 
problem 
 
  The second method for the nodal price analysis follows a different approach up to a 
certain point. This method has been implemented in [38]. As in the previous method, 
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the vector x  is used in order to simplify the OPF form. It is now possible to rewrite the 
OPF of (2.8) as follows: 
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  It is known from the optimisation theory, the solution of a nonlinear optimisation 
problem, such as OPF, may also be the solution of a linear program (LP). The problem 
of (2.17) can be linearised at the solution point 0x . The resulting linear programming 
has the following form: 
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  The gradients at point 0x  have the same value with the gradients at solution point by 
the first method. In this case the symbol 0x  is used in order to underline the 
linearisation process and to distinguish the linearisation point from the vector of 
variables x . 
  According to the optimisation theory each linear programming problem can be linked 
to a dual problem [51]. For the problem of (2.18) the variables of its dual problem are 
the Lagrange multipliers of the problem of (2.17). In the primal problem all the 
variables of vector x  are free. Therefore, the dual problem has only equality 
constraints. The detailed form of that dual problem is as follows: 
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where the cba ,,  and d  are defined as follows: 
 
  )]()([ 000 xfxxfa x rr −+∇=  (2.20a) 
 )]()([ 000 xfxxfb x −+∇=  (2.20b) 
 )]()([ 000 xgxxgc x −+∇=  (2.20c) 
 )]()([ 000 xhxxhd x −+∇=  (2.20d) 
 
  From the equality constraints of (2.19) the gradients with respect to V  and θ  may be 
obtained. The derived equations are the same with (2.12a) and (2.12b). The further 
process, in order to achieve the split up of nodal prices in two components, is the same 
as in the first method. 
 
2.5 Congestion component analysis  
 
  Once the nodal prices are decomposed, their component due to system congestions is 
available. For the system operator is of great importance to know how the different 
network restrictions influence the nodal prices. Having this knowledge the system 
operator may make the right decisions so as to cope with the congested situation. So, it 
is obviously that there is a necessity of decomposing further the congestion component. 
This decomposition should result in an allocation of nodal price congestion component 
to the single system constraints. The vector Cλ , given by (2.15b), is a column vector 
which embraces the congestion component of nodal prices for active and reactive power 
for all the system buses except the reference bus r . This bus has nodal prices only due 
to generation and losses. If 1−= bnm , where bn  is the number of system buses, then 
it is: 
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[ ]TCQmCQiCQCPmCPiCPC λλλλλλ ,...,,...,,,...,,..., 11=λ  (2.21) 
 
where 
CPiλ : congestion component of nodal price for active power at bus i . 
CQiλ : congestion component of nodal price for reactive power at bus i . 
 
  On the other hand, the column vector µ  comprises the Lagrange multipliers 
corresponding to the bus voltage magnitude constraints as well as for the line power 
flow limits. If the system has l  lines then it can be written: 
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where 
minViµ : Lagrange multiplier with respect to the lower voltage magnitude limit at 
bus i . 
maxViµ : Lagrange multiplier with respect to the upper voltage magnitude limit at 
bus i . 
Ljµ :  Lagrange multiplier with respect to the power flow limit on line j . 
 
  In order to simplify further the analysis, the matrix A  is introduced. This matrix is 
defined as follows: 
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where all the gradients are evaluated at the solution point 0x . 
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Thus, (2.15b) can be rewritten as: 
 Aµλ =C  (2.24) 
 
 A more detailed form of (2.24) can be given: 
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From (2.25) one may find out that: 
 
 ∑+
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where 
kika µ : congestion component part of nodal price for active power at bus i  due 
to constraint k  
lb nn +2 : total number of bus voltage magnitude and line power flow constraints 
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  The aim is to estimate the contribution of each congestion to the nodal price 
congestion component. For this purpose it is useful to replace the vector µ  in (2.24) 
with the matrix M . 
 
 )(µΜ diag=  (2.27) 
 
  Through this replacement a new matrix Λ  can be obtained: 
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where 
minPVΛ : matrix which contains in an arbitrary line i  the contribution of the lower 
voltage magnitude limits to the CPiλ  
maxPVΛ : matrix which contains in an arbitrary line i  the contribution of the upper 
voltage magnitude limits to the CPiλ  
PLΛ :  matrix which contains in an arbitrary line i  the contribution of the line 
power flow limits to the CPiλ  
minQVΛ : matrix which contains in an arbitrary line i  the contribution of the lower 
voltage magnitude limits to the CQiλ  
maxQVΛ : matrix which contains in an arbitrary line i  the contribution of the upper 
voltage magnitude limits to the CQiλ  
QLΛ :  matrix which contains in an arbitrary line i  the contribution of the line 
power flow limits to the CQiλ  
 
  So, each line i  from the first m  lines of matrix Λ  comprises the system constraints’ 
contribution to the nodal price congestion component for active power of bus i . 
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Moreover, each im +  line includes the influence of system constraints on the 
congestion component for reactive power at bus i . 
  Let the constraints at columns a , b and c  of Λ  be the upper and lower voltage limit 
at bus s  and the power flow limit on line j , respectively. Then it is easy to find out 
from (2.28) that: 
 
 biaisVCPi ,,, λλλ +=  (2.29a) 
 cijLCPi ,, λλ =  (2.29b) 
 
where 
sVCPi,λ : part of congestion component for active power nodal price at bus 
i  due to voltage magnitude constraints at bus s  
jLCPi,λ : part of congestion component for active power nodal price at bus 
i  due to power flow constraint on line j  
cibiai ,,, ,, λλλ : elements of the i  row of matrix Λ  
 
  From (2.29a) and (2.29b), it is obvious that matrix Λ  enables the estimation of system 
constraints’ contribution to nodal price congestion component. Thus, the aim of 
allocating the congestion component to each single system congestion is straight 
forward.  
 
2.6 Congestion management methods 
 
  One of the most challenging tasks in the deregulated electricity market is the 
management of congestion situations. There are three basic reasons that justify this fact. 
The first is the existence of numerous participants in the marketplace. Suppliers, 
consumers and the system operator have sometimes conflicting interests and the variety 
of their aims results in a complexity by the market operation. This complexity is further 
aggravated in the event of scarce resources, in other words in case of system 
2.6  Congestion management methods 37
congestions. The second reason is based on the electricity physics. The power flows 
according to Kirchhoff’s laws through all the available paths. Thus, the power of any 
transaction agent or market participant cannot be restricted to flow only over certain 
lines. Modern devices such as FACTS permit a better control of power flow. However, 
the phenomenon of power flow remains a not fully controllable issue. Last but not least 
it should be mentioned the inability to store electrical energy in significant quantities. 
Batteries’ capacity is neglected in comparison to the power system size. The most 
important storage method to date is the use of pump storage hydroelectric power plants. 
Water is pumped up to a reservoir during the off-peak period. Then, this quantity of 
water is used at peak time to produce power. In spite of their importance, the pump 
storage power plants cannot solve the problem of electrical energy storage. New 
technology in the field of materials enables the manufacturing of huge capacitors where 
electrical energy can be stored in form of electromagnetic field in quantities up to 1 
GWh. However, the economic efficient use of such technologies, in order to solve the 
storage problem, remains a future scenario. 
  The above mentioned reasons highlight the importance of an efficient congestion 
management. Different methods, depending on the electricity market structure, have 
been implemented so as to deal with this task.  
  In a bilateral market the common practice is the capacity auctions. The system 
operator periodically auctions the capacity, partly or fully, over certain lines. These are 
the lines, which are usually congested. The capacity auction can be considered as a 
purchase of physical rights to transfer power over certain path. The interesting market 
participants offer their bids in the same way as for each other commodity. The cross 
border lines connecting Germany and the Netherlands is a typical example of capacity 
auctions in a bilateral market. The capacity of submarine high voltage direct current 
wire which links Italy to Greece is another case where the power transfer rights are 
allocated by auctions. It should be underlined that the capacity auctions concern each 
direction in a separate way. That is, the right to trade power over the certain line to one 
direction is different than the right to transfer power to the other direction. Thus, 
separate auctions take place for the capacity at each direction. In the English market 
capacity auctions are also a common practice [52].  
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  The congestion management in pool market may be more detailed and efficient. The 
reason is that there is available economic information about the scarce resources. This 
information is obtained as a by-product of optimal power flow mechanism. The 
congestion management methods of pool market may also be applied to a mixed 
pool/bilateral market. The economic information is in this case available through the 
pool market and can be connected to the bilateral transactions. Actually, the combined 
electricity markets are the most ideal case of deregulated power market. These markets 
offer to their participants the flexibility to choose between firm contracts and the 
purchase of power at the spot market. Such markets are seen as the final state of power 
sector deregulation. Therefore, it is of important to see how the congestion management 
takes place in these markets.  
  When the pool market operates without nodal pricing the methods which are usually 
used are the zonal pricing and the countertrade. These methods will be analysed in 
detail in the next Chapter in the context of Nord Pool.  
  In the pool markets that are based on locational marginal pricing (LMP) the congestion 
management is associated with the congestion component of nodal prices. So, it 
becomes now obvious the importance of nodal prices analysis which has been done 
before. Some works on congestion management with OPF implementation can be found 
in [53, 54]. Because of nodal price variation, it has been proposed the introduction of 
Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) that helps consumers and producers to hedge the 
risk caused by the price variation [55]. The FTRs are contracts that give the right to 
their holders to transfer power from point-to-point without taking into consideration the 
system performance. Hence, the possible existence of congestion does not affect the 
price that the power is delivered. The holder of such a contract pays only for the 
production and the losses. What really happens is that the contract holder pays for the 
delivered power the full nodal price, which is calculated for his location. Then, he 
receives a compensation, for the contracted amount of power, from system operator 
equal to the difference between the nodal price at the injection and take-over bus. This 
is valid when the holder is a transaction agent. If the holder is a single consumer then he 
receives the difference between the spot price at his bus and the reference bus. As 
mentioned above, the nodal price at reference bus is said to have only the component 
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due to generation and losses. These two cases of FTRs implementation are 
mathematically described as follows: 
 
 )( riii PCP λλ −∗=  (2.30a) 
 )( 21 λλ −∗= ii PCP  (2.30b) 
 
where 
iCP :  compensation payment to market participant i 
iP :  contracted power associated with the market participant i 
iλ :  nodal price at bus of i 
21,λλ : nodal price at injection and takeoff bus respectively 
 
  The former, i.e. (2.30a), is related with a single consumer while the latter corresponds 
to a power transaction in the context of a bilateral/pool market. The FTRs are 
considered as a very useful tool in order to achieve an optimal market performance. 
First of all, they give the chance to market participants to protect themselves from the 
nodal price variations. Thus, the FTRs operate as a risk hedging tool. The second major 
benefit of FTRs is that they can stimulate the investment in transmission facilities. The 
system operator may assign FTRs to investors. The market participants are looking for 
purchase the FTRs, which are now a property of investors, and protect themselves from 
system congestions. When the price of FTRs becomes higher than the cost of build-up 
the new facilities the investors start to realise their investment plans. For these two 
reasons the FTRs are so valuable. Such financial contracts are already implemented in 
Australia, the markets of PJM and New England in USA and there is an ongoing 
process aiming to the introduction of FTRs in the market of New Zealand. 
  The Flowgate Rights (FGR) make up an alternative to the FTRs [56]. In a market, 
which has adopted the FGRs, the transactions are charged for the use of the congested 
lines. The charge is based on the usage of the congested line from the side of each 
transaction, measured by the Power Transfer Distribution Factors, and the shadow price 
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of the congested line, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier µ . If a transaction agent wants to 
avoid this charge then the agent has to purchase FGRs for the congested lines. 
  Another approach of calculating the congestions charges allocated to the different 
market parties is presented in [57]. In this case the impact of congestion to nodal prices 
is calculated through an Aumann-Shapley procedure. The benefit of this method is that 
the total congestion charge equals the cost increase caused by the congestion.  
  The congestion management is, generally, a complicated and highly demanding task. 
The role of system operator is very important towards systemwide efficiency. However, 
the ISO is not able to solve all the problems that appear because of congestions [58]. 
Proper design of electricity market is a prerequisite for a harmonious market 
performance that cannot be replaced by any ISO’s action.  
 
2.7 Congestion component allocation 
 
  As it has already been seen, the nodal price congestion component is of great 
significance considering the congestion management. In the framework of the present 
work, a novel method which links the congestion component to the players of electricity 
marketplace has been developed. The method’s basis is a combined use of congestion 
component analysis and distribution factors.  
 
2.7.1 Power flow tracing in terms of distribution factors 
 
2.7.1.1 On power flow distribution factors 
 
  The concept behind the use of distribution factors is to find out how a particular 
generator or load influences the power flow over particular network lines. Until some 
years ago the interest of tracing the electricity was limited because the vertically 
integrated utilities had little interest to find their own generators impact on their own 
lines. Therefore, the scientific work on this field has not been so extended.  
  The Generation Shift Distribution Factors (GSDF) had been used in 1970s in order to 
deal with the task of power flow tracing. Those factors give the change of power flow 
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over a particular line after a generation shift. At that time, when the load flow 
calculation time was still an essential issue, the GSDFs were a good alternative to the 
complete power flow calculation.  
  In 1981 the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors (GGDF) have been proposed 
in [59]. Those factors were an improvement in comparison to GSDFs because their 
results were not dependent on a reference bus. Moreover, the total generation should not 
remain constant, which was a prerequisite in case of GSDFs. The basis of GGDFs is the 
equations of a DC load flow. So, their use is limited to the active power flow. The 
GGDFs show the impact of a particular generator on the power flow over a particular 
line. This impact may also be negative.  
  Recently, the need of power flow tracing has been increased. The reason is the 
deregulated environment of modern power markets with the unbundled services and the 
numerous participants. The detailed calculation of the different parties’ impact on the 
network situation has lead to the development of a variety of distribution factors. In [60] 
the Topological Generation Distribution Factors (TGDF) have been presented. The 
TGDFs calculate the share of a particular generator on the power flow over any line. 
Their basis is a lossesless power network and consequently, they do not take into 
consideration the role of reactive power.   
  Another category of well-known factors are the Power Transfer Distribution Factors 
(PTDF) [61]. The PTDFs are calculated using a DC load flow. The difference to the 
previous factors is that the PTDFs determine the part of a power transaction that flow 
over a particular line. For a given network topology it is easy to calculate a matrix 
containing the PTDFs for all the possible power transactions. This matrix can be 
determined on the basis of a hypothetical 1 MW transaction. Then, the impact of each 
real transaction on the power flow over a line may be found by multiplying the 
transaction’s PTDF corresponding to this line with the transaction’s power amount. 
 
2.7.1.2 The Nodal Generation Distribution Factors 
 
  The main drawback of the above mentioned methods is that they use a DC 
approximation and so the calculated factors neglect the impact of reactive in power 
losses. In the context of the present work, the aim was to achieve an approach to system 
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situation with possible high acriby. Therefore, the factors that have been used to trace 
the power flow are the Nodal Generation Distribution Factors (NGDF) [62]. 
  Basis for the calculation of the NGDFs is the proportional sharing principle. The 
principle is illustrated in Figure 2.4 .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Proportional sharing principle 
 
Since electricity cannot be distinguished, the principle suggests that the share of a 
particular line IiA, which supplies bus A, in power flow over a particular line AOj 
which is supplied from bus A, is equal to the share of  
line IiA in the sum of power inflows into the bus A: 
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where  
AΨ :  set of lines supplying bus A 
IiAP , AOjP : active power flows over the lines IiA and AOj 
AOjIiAP , : share of line IiA in the power flow over the line AOj 
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  In (2.31) the power inflows may be replaced from the total contribution of the system 
generators to feeding of bus A . Through this replacement one can obtain from the right 
side of (2.31) the nodal generation distribution factor kAL ,  of a particular generator k . 
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where  
kAP , : contribution of generator k  to the active power flow feeding bus A  
Gn : number of system generators 
 
  Using the NGDFs it is possible to calculate the share kAOjP ,  of generator k in power 
flow over a certain line AOj, which is supplied by bus A: 
 
 AOjkAkAOj PLP ,, =  (2.33) 
 
  For the computation of kAP ,  a direction search algorithm is used. This algorithm 
searches for power flow directions given the results of an AC power flow. Thus, the 
method takes into consideration the reactive power too. Distribution factors tracing the 
flow of both active and reactive power may be determined. Therefore, it is possible to 
generalize (2.32). Instead of P  the symbol M can be used. Now, M represents either 
the active or the reactive power. So, one may calculate kAL ,  for both active and 
reactive power. 
  Now the task is to determine the quantity kAM , , which shows the impact of generator 
k on the power inflows, active or reactive power, at bus A. The power inflows and the 
generation at bus A have to be taken into account. That is: 
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where 
kAM , :  the share of generator located at bus k to power inflows at bus A 
AM : active or reactive generation at bus A 
iAM : active or reactive power flow over line iA 
kiL , : NGDF of generator k for the bus i which is the start point of line iA 
 
  As can be seen from (2.34), the order of calculations is important. First of all, the 
NGDFs of all the lines, which supply the bus A, have to be found. Therefore, the 
calculation of NGDFs must start from the source buses. A source bus is characterized as 
a bus, which is not supplied by any line. For the source buses the set AΨ  is equal to the 
empty set. Of course, the sources buses are a subset of generator buses. In Figure 2.5 the 
search algorithm is illustrated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Search procedure for NGDFs’ calculation 
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  The buses 1 and 2 are not supplied by any line so the calculation of NGDFs begins 
from these two buses. For these two buses the quantity kAM ,  is equal to the bus 
generation if k=A and zero at any other case. Consequently, from (2.32) it is obvious 
that the =1,1L 1 and zero for all the other buses. Similarly, =2,2L 1 and zero for any 
other bus. Thus, the NGDFs at the beginning of lines 1-3, 1-4, 2-4 and 2-5 are known 
and so the quantities kAM ,  can now be calculated for the buses 3, 4 and 5. The 
procedure continues until the NGDFs are calculated for each system bus. 
  An extension of the Nodal Generation Distribution Factors has been realised in the 
context of this work. Distribution factors for loads have been calculated too. In this case 
the source buses of the search algorithm are those that are only supplied. These source 
buses neither have generation nor supply any line. For the example of Figure 2.5 the 
source buses are the buses 5, 6 and 7. Thus, the calculation of Nodal Load Distribution 
Factors (NLDF) is realised. The NLDFs facilitate the calculation of load share in the 
power flow over a particular line in the same way as the NGDFs.  
 
2.7.2 Connecting congestion component and market players 
 
  It is of great importance in the modern deregulated electricity markets the congestion 
pricing to be a competitive pricing. This is necessary in order to establish a proper 
market operation. If the system operator wants to achieve this aim then the operator has 
to provide the participants in marketplace with a transparent pricing. Moreover, the ISO 
has to send to suppliers and consumers, through the congestion pricing, the right 
economical signals [31]. These signals concern the locational advantages for investment 
in generation and demand. Furthermore, the signals should indicate the need for 
investment in new transmission facilities. 
  In this work, a novel method for the connection of congestion component and market 
participants has been proposed. This connection aims to make more transparent the 
congestion situation. The second objective is to allocate the congestion components to 
the congestion causers. The power system restrictions, such as voltage and power flow 
limits, may become active in order to serve the producers’ and consumers’ patterns. 
Consequently, a connection between the market participants and the nodal price 
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congestion component has to be determined. Investigating the impact of system 
congestions on the nodal price for active power the role of voltage restrictions turned 
out to be insignificant in most of the cases. Also in [63, 64], by studying the influence 
of the congestion on the nodal prices, only power flow limits are taken into 
consideration. A comparison between the two components shows that the line power 
flow congestions have an influence on the nodal prices, which is from 10 to 1000 times 
higher than the voltage congestions’ influence. Of course, there are exceptions but those 
cases rather confirm the rule that voltage congestions’ influence can be neglected. 
Consequently, for a bus i  the part of congestion component caused by active line 
constraints can be considered equal to the whole congestion component, i.e.: 
 
 CPiLCPi λλ ≅  (2.35) 
 
  The NGD-Factors can now be used for achieving the allocation of nodal price 
congestion component caused by power flow constraints to particular generators. As it 
has been shown, these factors estimate the share of each generator in the power flow on 
a particular line. Assume that all suppliers are treated equally concerning the line 
congestions. That is, the share of a supplier in power flow over a congested line 
mirrored to linearly to the supplier’s share in congestion creation. In this case the 
NGDFs can be used for calculation of generators’ participation in the congestion nodal 
price component. From the previous congestion component analysis, the impact of each 
single congestion on the nodal price congestion component of each bus has been 
calculated. So, this impact incorporated with the NGDFs enables the computation of the 
total share of a generator k  to the congestion component of nodal price at bus i : 
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where  
kLCPi,λ : part of congestion component due to line congestions at bus i  which is 
allocated to generator k . 
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Cl :  number of system congested lines 
 
  Summing the share of all generators in the congestion component of bus i one can 
obtain the whole congestion component of this bus: 
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The conclusion drawn by (2.37) is that the above presented method results in an ex post 
reallocation of the nodal price congestion components to suppliers. The sense of this 
reallocation is the connection, through the NGDF, between the congestion costs and 
their origins. The kLCPi,λ  may be treated, in the most cases, as the total congestion 
component of bus i.  
  The same process can be used in order to allocate the congestion component to the set 
of consumers. The only difference is that in this case the NLDFs should be used instead 
the NGDFs.  
 
2.7.3 Case studies 
 
  In order to highlight the usefulness of the proposed method a pool market case has 
been investigated. The calculations have been carried out by a modified version of 
MATPOWER program [65]. The pool market network is the IEEE 14-bus system, 
which is shown in Figure 2.6. In this case study, the system comprises four suppliers 
and four consumers. The network data as well as the participants’ economic offers can 
be found in Appendix A. Transfer capability limits on lines 2-4, 4-5 and 6-13 have been 
reduced to 50%, 80% and 50% of their original value, which are given in Table A.1, 
respectively. In the basic case the power flow on lines 2-4, 4-5 and 6-13 has reached the 
transfer limit. The upper voltage limit reached at buses 3 and 12. The congestion 
component analysis shows that the voltage congestions’ impact on the nodal prices is 
insignificant. Figure 2.7 illustrates the different size of the two congestion component 
parts. 
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Figure 2.6 The IEEE 14-bus system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Share of line and voltage congestions in  
congestion components of nodal prices 
 
Thus, the essential task is the estimation of active line power flow constraints’ influence 
on the nodal prices. The share in the congestion component of nodal prices, each of the 
three active line power flow constraints, is presented in Figure 2.8. All the lines are not 
congested with the same intensity. The Lagrange multiplier µ , of the corresponding 
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line power transfer constraint, is a measure for the congestion intensity. For the lines 2-
4, 4-5 and 6-13 the multiplier µ  is 4.253, 0.269 and 1.179, respectively. The variation 
of µ  is the reason for the different impact, which has each congested line on the 
congestion component of nodal price.  
  Furthermore, a congested line does not affect in the same way the nodal price at all the 
buses as in Figure 2.8 shown. From (2.36), it is obvious that for the calculation of 
generator impact on nodal price congestion component the NGDFs can be used. These 
factors are listed in Table 2.1, in the left columns under the generator name for the basic 
case. The columns in Table 2.1 with the caption ‘shifted bid’ refer to the case where a 
market participant has changed his bid prices. This case will be analysed below. The 
impact of each generator of the nodal price of each bus is presented in Figure 2.9. It is 
evident that the generators have different impact on congestion component and in 
different way at each system bus.  
  The generator’s share in congestion component of nodal prices (here weighted by the 
power of each bus and given as percentage of the sum of all generators) is not related in 
a proportional way with the generation contribution to active power production. As 
Figure 2.10 shows, the generator 2 has a high share in congestion component despite the 
fact that it produces only 12% of the total active power. The explanation is that it has 
also a high share in active power flow over line 2-4 which is congested in more 
intensive degree than the other two congested lines. Thus, a congestion pricing method 
should not be based only on power production of generators.  
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
bus
L 2-4 L 4-5 L 6-13
 
Figure 2.8 Share of lines in congestion component of nodal prices 
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Figure 2.9 Allocation of congestion component of nodal prices to generators 
 
Table 2.1 
Lagrange multiplier µ and NGDFs in IEEE 14-bus system 
 µ NGDF Gen.1 NGDF Gen.2 NGDF Gen.3 NGDF Gen.6 
Line Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
2-4 4.253 2.982 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.04 0.11 0.53 0.00 0.00 
4-5 0.269 0.136 0.59 0.60 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.18 
6-13 1.179 1.194 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
3-4 0.000 2.537 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 
This method for allocating the congestion component to the generators may be used by 
the pool operator in order to apply an efficient and fair congestion pricing. A possible 
application could be the incorporation of the proposed method with the Financial 
Transmission Rights. Assume that the system operator has to pay a holder of FTR 
contract. Applying the proposed method the system operator may find out who caused 
the congestion components that the operator has to pay for. It is not sure that the system 
operator will then shift the FTR cost to the congestion causers. But in any case the ISO 
may have a detailed knowledge of the system’s economic situation. Except the pure 
pool markets the above presented allocation can also be used in case of third party 
access (TPA) market as the next section shows. 
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Figure 2.10 Share of generators in active power production  
and congestion component of nodal prices 
 
2.8 Market participants’ behaviour 
 
  Since the electricity market has been deregulated the participants have a variety of 
choices to improve their standing in the market. A set of different bidding strategies 
may be adopted by the participants in order to maximize their profit [66]. The 
consequences that such strategies have on the network operation are the subject of the 
following analysis.  
 
2.8.1 Pool model 
 
  In a pool market, the main strategy that the players have towards the individual profit 
maximization is the change of their bid patterns. For the pool operator, it is very 
interesting to have knowledge of the consequences on the system situation because of 
the bid pattern changes.  
  Such a case has been studied in the context of pool market, located in the IEEE 14-bus 
system, which has been presented in the previous section. The supplier who owns the 
generator at bus 3 aims to increase its share in power production. For this reason the 
supplier submit to the pool operator a bid pattern with reduced bid prices. After this bid 
change a new network situation emerges. In this new situation the power flow on line 3-
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4 has reached the transfer limit while all the three congestions of basic case remain too. 
The Lagrange multiplier µ, corresponding to the new situation, is given in Table 2.1 in 
the right columns, under the caption ‘shifted bid’. As this index shows, the congestion 
intensity on lines 2-4, 4-5 is decreased while it is slightly increased on line 6-13.  
  In Table 2.1, the NGDFs of all generators, for the case that emerged by the bid change, 
are listed in the right columns. As can be observed, the NGDFs of generator 3 on all the 
lines, where the congestion situation is now different, have been either increased or 
remained at the same level. Generator 3 has not reduced NGDFs over any of these four 
lines. That is, the bid price reduction of supplier owning generator 3 is associated with 
the changes on the status of congested lines. During this research work, a number of 
various systems has been investigated .The results obtained at all of these systems have 
shown that only in event of zero NGDF, before and after the bid reduction, the 
corresponding producer has not increased share in the congestions. It is indifferent if the 
congestions in the new situation are relaxed or have been become more intensive. What 
has been observed is that the suppliers who have reduced their bid price have increased 
share in the power flow over those lines. These remarks have been confirmed not only 
for pure pool operation model. 
 
2.8.2 Third party access 
 
  The case of direct purchase, within a combined pool/bilateral market, can also be 
considered as a bid reduction of the corresponding supplier. For the part of power that 
corresponds to the dimerous trade the supplier gives a very low bid price to the system 
operator. Consequently, the power resource associated with this bid will be surely used 
by the OPF program. On the other hand the consumer who participates at the direct 
purchase submits an offer, for the same amount of power, with a very high bid price. 
Thus, the full consumer’s demand will be surely covered, if the system situation does 
not prevent the full cover, by the OPF program. Thus, in this way a direct purchase is 
incorporated in the OPF. Two Third Party Access (TPA) cases have been realised in the 
IEEE 14-bus system. The results of these two cases are illustrated in Table 2.2 . 
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Table 2.2 
Lagrange multiplier µ and NGDFs for the TPA cases 
 µ NGDF Gen.2 NGDF Gen.6 
Line Basic case 
TPA 
2→9 
TPA 
6→9 
Basic 
case 
TPA 
2→9 
Basic 
case 
TPA 
6→9 
2-4 4.253 5.213 2.478 0.46 0.86 0.00 0.00 
4-5 0.269 0.138 1.867 0.18 0.33 0.19 0.28 
6-13 1.179 1.183 2.422 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
  In the first case the consumer at bus 9 purchases 70 MW directly from producer at 
node 2. The realisation of this purchase results in no new congestion. As the multiplier 
µ  shows, two of the existing congestions are now stronger while the third one has 
reduced its intensity. For the generator at bus 2, the NGDFs on congested lines, after the 
direct selling, have been either increased or remained unchanged at zero.  
  The second TPA case that has been realised considers a direct purchase of 70 MW. 
The buyer is located at bus 9 and the seller at bus 6. In this case the congestions on lines 
4-5 and 6-13 are now stronger while the line 2-4 is less intensive congested and no new 
congestion appears. The NGDFs of generator at bus 6, concerning these three lines, 
either remain unchanged or they are increased. This fact confirms that the above 
mentioned remarks are valid also in a combined pool/bilateral market. 
  As can be observed from Table 2.3, the objective function of OPF is reduced in both 
TPA cases. Nevertheless, applying the congestion component allocation method it is 
evident that the share of the corresponding producer in congestion component is, in both 
cases, increased. In this case the share has been computed in absolute values rather than 
in percentage as in Fig. 2.10.   
 
Table 2.3 
Generators’ share in congestion component for the TPA cases 
case 
Objective 
function [€/h] 
Share 
of Gen. 2 [€/h]
Share 
of Gen. 6 [€/h] 
Basic 19396 3296 344 
TPA 2→9 17913 7451 - 
TPA 6→9 17204 - 398 
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If the pool operator applies a wheeling pricing regarding only the nodal price difference 
then the producers, who participates at the TPA, may not be charged for it or they even 
may get a credit. In case that the pool operator regards the congestion situation, and 
especially the transmission congestion contracts, that have to be paid, then the 
producers may be charged though the reduction of nodal prices.  
 
2.8.3 Producers’ behaviour in a realistic network 
 
  The same investigation, as of IEEE 14-bus system, has been carried out on a realistic 
high voltage network. This system, which is illustrated in Figure 2.11, is part of the 
European network and comprises more than 400 transmission lines that operate at 
voltage levels of 380 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV. In the presented investigations, 55 
suppliers and 20 consumers have been located in the network area. The congestions 
presented here have been created artificially and they do not match the real network 
situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Illustration of the investigated large network 
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  In the initial situation, the lines 1 and 2 are congested as can be seen, by multiplier µ, 
in Table 2.4. The NGDFs of four selected suppliers, who own four generators, are also 
listed in Table 2.4. For the basic case the NGDFs are given in the left columns.   
  In order to increase its market share, the producer who owns generator A shifts down 
the bid price. This bid shift results in a new system situation, which is shown in Table 
2.4, in the right columns. In the new network situation, the lines 1 and 2 are congested 
in a more intensive way while no new congestions appear.  
 
Table 2.4 
NGDFs in a realistic high voltage network 
 
  Table 2.4 shows that the share of generator A in power flow over line 1 is increased. 
On the other hand, the share of this generator in power flow on line 2 remains at zero, as 
it was before the bid change. This fact confirms the remarks that have been made in 
case of IEEE 14-bus system. In this part of European network, there is a large demand 
between line 1 and line 2. Therefore, the producer who owns the generator A cannot 
impact the power flow on line 2. The power flow on that line is affected by the 
production of suppliers who own the generators B, C and D. 
 
2.8.4 Consumers’ behaviour in a realistic network 
 
  In the deregulated pool electricity markets not only the producers but also the 
consumers can influence the network situation by changing their bid patterns. An 
interesting case with negative nodal prices has been emerged in the part of European 
network, which has been presented in the previous section. That case is resulted through 
a pandemic increase of demand. The nodal price at buses E and F is now negative and 
equal to -1.72 ct/kWh and -0.33 ct/kWh, respectively.  
 µ NGDF  Gen. A 
NGDF  
Gen. B 
NGDF  
Gen. C 
NGDF 
 Gen. D 
Line Basic case 
Shifted 
bid 
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid  
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid  
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
Basic 
case 
Shifted 
bid 
1 0.482 0.511 0.44 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 9.617 9.866 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.38 0.38 
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  According to the spot pricing theory of electricity a negative nodal price is an 
economical signal for either increase of demand or decrease of production at the 
corresponding bus. This change should lead to a lower value of the total costs, which is 
the objective function in the pool market. Neither at bus E nor at bus F is located any 
load. In order to decrease the objective function, a consumer offers a bid for purchasing 
energy at bus E. Increasing the bid price, the consumer receives more energy. Table 2.5 
shows that the total costs are indeed reduced by increasing the demand at bus E. Except 
the economical aspect also the system situation should be investigated in this case. For 
this purpose the NLDFs can been used. Table 2.6 shows that after the location of 200 
MW load at bus E there are two congested lines.  
 
Table 2.5 
Reduction of objective function 
Load at bus E [MW] 
 
0 200 700 
Objective function [€/h] 477260 473360 465690 
Nodal price at bus E [ct/kWh] -1.72 -1.79 7.40 
 
 
Table 2.6 
System situation and NLDFs of consumer at bus E 
 µ NLDFs of consumer at bus E 
Load at bus E [MW] 0 200 700 0 200 700 
Branch 1 1.470 1.591 1.431 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Branch 2 19.242 19.194 18.724 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Branch 3 0 0 0.138 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Branch 4 (trans.) 0 0 0.016 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Branch 5 (trans.) 0 0 6.033 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
  The power transfer restrictions at those lines were binding at the basic case too. When 
the consumer shifts up the bid price and the load increases to 700 MW then 3 new 
congestions appear. The NLDFs of consumer at bus E, for all the five branches, either 
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remain unchanged or they are increased. This remark has been observed in all the 
investigated cases with consumer bid increase and is comparable to the remarks, which 
have been noticed by producer bid decrease. Consequently, the bid change, which leads 
to increase of produced or purchased power has the same kind of influences on the 
network situation.  
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Chapter 3 
Operation mode assessment of a 
real market 
 
 
 
3.1 The Nord Pool  
 
  The pool model has not been realized in the same way in the numerous countries that 
have already deregulated their power sector. The mathematical background of the 
optimisation, which is the basis of the pool model, is implemented using different 
options. Thus, there are marketplaces where locational marginal prices are used while 
the operation mode of other markets is consistent with a global market clearing price. In 
addition, the choice between DC and AC power flow leads to quite different market 
performance. In the framework of this research work, the operation mode of a real 
market, the Norwegian power market, has been investigated. 
  The Norwegian power market is part of a larger international deregulated marketplace, 
the well-known Nord Pool. After the eastern part of Denmark joined Nord Pool in 2000, 
the common marketplace comprises all four Scandinavian countries. The Nordic 
marketplace has five system operators and a pool operator whose responsibility is the 
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operation of the Pool Exchange. The system operator in Norway is the company 
Statnett. In Sweden the grid is operated by Kraftnät and in Finland by the company 
Fingrid. In Eastern Denmark the company Elkraft has the responsibility for the 
transmission system whereas in Western Denmark the system operator is the company 
Eltra. These five regional system operators have cooperation in the framework of the 
Nordel organization, which is established as early as in 1960s in order to support the 
power trade between the Scandinavian countries. The Nordic countries, as well as the 
system operators’ territories, are shown in Figure 3.1. Another characteristic of Nord 
Pool is that the electricity industry of each country is subject to a separate national 
regulatory authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The Nord Pool market 
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  The electrical energy is produced by different resources in each of the four countries. 
Almost 100% of energy in Norway is produced by hydroelectric power plants while the 
thermal power plants account to the great majority of the energy which is produced in 
Denmark. In addition, Finland and Sweden have nuclear plants, the latter with an 
essentially higher capacity in nuclear power generation. The total electrical energy 
consumption in year 2001 was about 393 TWh. The capacity of the diverse generation 
resources in Nord Pool countries is given in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 
Generation resources in Nordic countries, 2000 
 Norway Sweden Finland Denmark 
Hydro+Wind 27.5 GW 16.4 GW 2.9 GW 2.4 GW 
Nuclear - 9.4 GW 2.6 GW - 
Thermal 0.3 GW 5.0 GW 11.0 GW 9.5 GW 
Total 27.8 GW 30.8 GW 16.5 GW 11.9 GW 
 
  The 400 kV lines form the backbone of transmission network in Nordic countries. The 
secondary high voltage level varies between 132 kV in Eastern Denmark and 300 kV in 
Norway. Furthermore, the DC interconnections are of great importance for the network 
performance in Nordic region. There are High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) cables 
between Sweden and Finland and also between Sweden and the European mainland. 
Other HVDC cables link Sweden to Denmark as well as Norway to Denmark. 
Additionally, the building of DC interconnections linking Norway to the Netherlands 
and England has been planned. However, the plan of building the cable to the 
Netherlands has major difficulties to be completed. On the other hand, the 
interconnection to England is expected to be in operation in 2006. 
  The common element among all the Nordic countries is the Pool Exchange, also 
known as Nord Pool [67]. The shareholders of Nord Pool are the companies Statnett and 
Kraftnät. Each of these two companies owns 50% of the shares in Nord Pool. Market 
players bid their offers in a day-ahead basis. The pool operator clears, in the afternoon, 
the market of the next day. Power unbalances, resulting by differences between 
schedule and real dispatch, are treated within the regulating real time market. In 
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addition, there is a future market where contracts are traded in a weekly basis. The 30% 
of total consumption is traded in the Pool Exchange while the 70% is based on bilateral 
transactions. 
  Transmission pricing issues as well as congestion management methods are subject to 
the five network operators. This fact yields in a variety of different pricing schemes. In 
event of congestion two major methods are used. These methods are the zonal pricing in 
Norway and the countertrade in the other countries. These two mechanisms will be 
analytically presented in the next section.  
  The most actual topic of public discussions in Nordic countries is the price rise during 
dry years. Because the hydroelectric power plants make up a large part of installed 
generation capacity, a dry season affects explicitly the prices. The winter 2002/2003 
was such a period. The prices were essentially increased. Nevertheless, the market 
exhibited a pretty good performance. The reason is that, since the end consumers price 
are changed periodically, the end consumers faced this price increase and so they 
declined their demand. An analysis of data contained in [71] points that in Norway the 
consumption during the period 01.11.2002-28.02.2003 was 46.125 TWh. The electric 
energy which had been consumed in the period 01.11.2001-28.02.2002 was 47.437 
TWh. Furthermore, the peak demand in Norway, measured in hourly basis, in winter 
2002/2003 was 19.9 GWh while the maximal demand, for the same period, one year 
before was 20.7 GWh. If these differences do not seem to be large, one should also take 
into consideration that the power sectors in industrialized countries, usually, have to 
serve every year an increasing demand. Another fact, which has facilitated the cover of 
demand during the dry season, was the dispatching of mothballed thermal power plants.  
  For the near future, new interconnections to the European mainland as well as the 
increase of installed capacity are the two basic tools that the Nordic countries are going 
to use so as to cope with the dry season problem. 
 
3.2 The Norwegian market operation mode 
 
3.2.1 Loss factors 
 
  The Norwegian players, as every member of Nord Pool, are eligible to participate in 
the spot market. The procedure is common for all participants, no matter the country 
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where they are located. However, the different transmission and power loss pricing 
methods, that the national system operators apply, influence the participants’ offers. 
  The Norwegian high voltage network consists of 166 nodes. Periodically, the company 
Statnett, which is the Norwegian system operator, announces loss factors for each 
system node. Usually, the time interval, when these factors are valid, is 6-10 weeks. The 
objective of these factors is to cover the expenditure, which is associated with the power 
losses. The factors are given as percentage of the energy price at each system node. 
Each participant has to pay, for each traded MWh, to the Statnett an amount equal to the 
loss factor of the node where the participant is located.  
  Of course, this fact will affect the bids that the players submit to Pool Exchange. 
Generally, the pool operator accepts bids in two forms. Either the stepwise bids 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 or bids in form of linear functions which is presented in Figure 
3.2 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Continuous bid curves of supplier (left) and  
consumer (right) considering loss factor  
 
  The left side of Figure 3.2 shows the bid curve of a supplier. The original bid curve of 
this supplier is given by the solid line. As can be seen, the supplier has the willingness 
to inject power into the network up to its maxP  when the price is maxp . Let 
hypothesize, that the system operator assigns a positive loss factor for the node of this 
supplier. The supplier will shift the resulting costs to its bid. So, the bid curve, which 
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will be given to the system operator by that supplier, will be the upper dashed line. That 
is, for the same amount of power the supplier demands a higher price in order to cover 
the loss charge. It is also possible that the loss factor has a negative value. In this case, 
the supplier will get a credit for each injected MWh equal to the loss factor. So, the 
player may reduce its bid price so as to be more competitive. The resulting bid curve is 
illustrated by the lower dashed line.  
  In Figure 3.2, the right side presents the bid curve of a consumer. If there were no loss 
factors, the consumer would purchase energy only if the price would be lower than a 
certain value maxp . In case of positive loss factor, the consumer will offer less money 
for the same amount of power. Hence, its bid curve will be the lower dashed line. On 
the contrary, if the loss factor is negative, that is the consumer is granted an amount, 
then the bid curve will be represented by the upper dashed line. Now, the consumer is 
willing to pay more for the same amount of power. In any case, for both suppliers and 
consumers, the shift of the original bid curve along the y-axis is equal to the loss factor.  
 
3.2.2 Zonal pricing and countertrade 
 
  In Nord Pool, the congestion management is the responsibility of each system 
operator. This fact has resulted in two different congestion management methods that 
are used in the Nordic countries. Norway has adopted from the beginning on the zonal 
pricing scheme. In the other Nordic countries, the countertrade is used in order to deal 
with congestions.  
  The operator of the Pool Exchange, after the receipt of the participants’ bids, clears the 
market of the next day without taking into consideration the line power flow limits. 
Thus, a unique price for the whole system is determined. If the resulting dispatch 
violates any power flow limit, the Norwegian system operator splits up the country into 
two or more zones. The objective is to define such prices for each zone that will yield to 
a relief of the congestion. Each zone is treated as a node and the zonal prices are 
calculated through a DC-OPF. The transfer capacity between the different zones is the 
sum of capacities of the lines that connect the zones. After OPF is run the new prices 
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are announced to the market participants. This congestion method is described as zonal 
pricing [61].  
  In Figure 3.3 the zonal pricing principle is illustrated. The generator in Zone A submits 
a bid of 20 €/MW for its whole production spectrum while generator in Zone B 
demands 20 €/MW for the first 100 MW and 30 €/MW for the rest 100 MW. In the 
presented case the consumers are must-run so they have submitted bids high enough to 
be fully covered. The pool operator clears the market and calculates the global price, 
considering the loads that are 200 MW in each zone. In this case the global price is 20 
€/MWh. This price is attained by balancing demand and supply interest without taking 
into consideration the network. The generator in Zone A produces 300 MW and the 
generator in Zone B 100 MW. Consequently, the power flow over the line is 100 MW. 
If the transfer capacity of that line is only 90 MW then the system is constrained. In this 
case the system operator defines the Zones A and B and now runs an OPF considering 
the power flow limit over the lines that connect Zones A and B. The result of OPF is a 
price of 10 €/MWh in Zone A and 30 €/MWh in Zone B. These prices are actually the 
marginal cost for the corresponding production level of each generator. Now, the 
generator in Zone A produces 290 MW and the generator in Zone B is dispatched for 
110 MW. Thus, the flow over the line is only 90 MW which is consistent with line’s 
power flow limit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Example for demonstration Zonal Pricing and Countertrade 
Zone A Zone B 
200 MW 200 MW 
~ ~ 
Bid: 
300 MW @ 10 €/MWh 
Bid: 
100 MW @ 20 €/MWh 
100 MW @ 30 €/MWh 
MW90max, =LineP
 3.2  The Norwegian market operation mode 66 
The remark, that could be done, is that the price at zone with excess generation is 
reduced while the price at the zone with excess demand is increased.  
  The definition of the different zones is of great importance in zonal pricing. As it has 
been shown, different splitting results in different surplus for the participants and the 
system operator [68]. The question why zonal pricing is used instead of nodal pricing 
dates back to the foundation of Nord Pool. At that time, the year 1993, the nodal pricing 
in electricity was not so wide known. The first deregulated market which introduced 
nodal pricing was New Zealand in 1996. It is claimed that zonal pricing is not as 
complex as nodal pricing. Therefore it is still in use in the Norwegian market. However, 
the experience proves that some markets that started using zonal pricing turned into 
nodal pricing. The opposite has not happened yet. A characteristic example is the case 
of PJM, which changed from zonal pricing to nodal pricing after only one year of 
implementation, in 1998. Further flaw of zonal pricing is the lack of economical signal 
for new investments since the prices do not always reflect the real cost of each node.  
  The other congestion management method that is used in the Nordic countries is the 
countertrade. By the countertrade, the participants submit bids for upwards or 
downwards deviation from the preferred schedule [55, 70]. The first step of 
countertrade is the calculation of the market clearing price. The suppliers are paid and 
the consumers pay for the power that has been assigned to them at the market clearing 
price. If there is any congestion the system operator seeks the schedules that should be 
increased or reduced. If a generator is called to increase its production then it will be 
compensated by the adjusting bid that it has submitted. In case of reduction the 
generator will pay the system operator its downwards bid. The market equilibrium is 
maintained when consumers and producers/suppliers have after the implementation of 
countertrade earnings equal to the ones of the unconstrained case. The choice of 
participants who will take part in the countertrade is made through an optimization, 
which has as objective function the minimization of the countertrade costs for the 
network operator. In the example of Figure 3.3 the generator in Zone A should decrease 
its output while the generator in Zone B has to increase its production. Assume, for 
simplicity, that the adjusting bids of both generators are the same as the normal bids. 
The Table 3.2, which follows, illustrates how the countertrade mechanism operates and 
gives the payment system in both unconstrained and countertrade case.  
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Table 3.2 
On the countertrade explanation  
Unconstrained case 
 Generator A Generator B 
Payment 300*200=6000 €/h 100*20=2000 €/h 
Cost 300*10=3000 €/h 10*20=2000 €/h 
Earnings 6000-3000=3000 €/h 2000-2000=0 €/h 
Constrained case using countertrade 
 Generator A Generator B 
Payment 300*20=6000 €/h 100*20=2000 €/h 
Cost 290*10=2900 €/h 100*20+10*30=2300 €/h 
Credit by countertrade -10*10=-100 €/h 10*30=300 €/h 
Earnings 6000-2900+(-100)=3000 €/h 2000-2300+300=3000 €/h 
Additional cost for 
the network operator 
-100+300=200 €/h 
 
The cost illustrated in Table 3.2 is taken equal to the generators’ bids that are given in 
Figure 3.2. As can be seen from Table 3.2, the earnings of the two generators remain 
unchanged. However, through the countertrade arises extra cost for the network 
operator. Usually, the system operator covers the additional cost through the 
transmission pricing [61]. 
 
3.3 Analysis of the Norwegian market using 
AC- OPF 
 
  In the context of this research work, the operation mode of the Norwegian electricity 
market has been investigated using a complete AC-OPF. Both loss factors and zonal 
pricing have been analysed and interesting conclusions have been drawn. This section 
presents the necessary theoretical background in order to realise this investigation. 
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3.3.1 Nodal price loss component 
 
  In the case of loss factors, the objective of the investigation is to identify in which 
degree the use of loss factors, incorporating a DC-OPF, reflects the real network 
situation. In order to achieve this aim the following steps are necessary: 
Step 1: A complete AC-OPF is used. Nodal prices are calculated for each node. 
Step 2: The loss component of nodal prices is computed. 
Step 3: This loss component is used as nodal loss factor. 
Step 4: The participants’ bids are modified according to the loss component. 
Step 5: The modified bids are given as input in a DC-OPF. 
Step 6: New nodal prices are calculated. 
Step 7: The net price of each participant is defined by adding/subtracting the loss 
factor from the new nodal prices. 
Step 8: Comparisons between the original nodal prices, obtained by AC-OPF, and the 
new net nodal prices may be done. 
 
  The above described procedure indicates the need of computing the loss component. In 
the nodal price analysis of Chapter 2, the nodal prices have been partitioned into two 
component, as (2.16) shows. One component which is due to generation and losses and 
another component which corresponds to system congestions. The former may be 
further decomposed into a component for generation and a loss component. This has as 
prerequisite that the nodal prices at reference bus are only due to generation. The 
assumption of nodal price analysis in Chapter 2 was that, at the reference bus a marginal 
increase of demand can be locally covered by the bus generator. If this hypothesis holds 
then the marginal increase of demand at the reference bus does not cause additional 
power losses. Thus, it is: 
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 (3.1) 
 
  Assuming that (3.1) is satisfied one may write that: 
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 rGrGL ,, λλ =  (3.2a) 
 0, =rLosλ  (3.2b) 
 
where 
Gλ : nodal price component due to generation 
Losλ : nodal price component due to losses 
 
Consequently, the loss component of nodal price, at any system bus i, is given from the 
following equation: 
 
 rGiGLiLos ,,, λλλ −=  (3.3) 
 
The (3.3) is valid for all the nodes because it is known that the deviation of nodal prices 
is caused by losses and congestions. Thus, if there are no losses and congestion one 
global price exists. Assuming that there is no congestion the deviations are only due to 
losses. That is what (3.3) shows. The deviation from the global price, here this global 
price would be equal to rG,λ , is defined as the loss component of nodal price. 
 
3.3.2 Zonal pricing based on nodal pricing algorithm 
 
  The major characteristic of the Norwegian market operation mode is the use of zonal 
pricing as congestion management tool. In case that zonal pricing is active, all the nodes 
that belong to a zone face the same price. The objective of this research work is to 
simulate a zonal pricing situation by means of a complete AC-OPF (nodal price 
mechanism). The zonal pricing situation leads to same nodal prices for all the nodes that 
belong to a zone.  
  Usually, the nodal price at a bus is equal to the marginal cost of this bus, which is 
given by its bid curve. That is: 
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Only in case that a generation limit is reached the nodal price is different than the 
marginal cost. Thus, if the scope is to obtain same nodal prices for all the nodes that 
participate in a zone an additional restriction must be put in the OPF in order to achieve 
this goal. This restriction demands that the generators of the buses, which participate in 
a zone, should operate with the same marginal cost.  
  The market operator may treat the supplier bid curves, shown in Figure 3.2, as 
marginal cost curves resulting from polynomial cost functions. Additionally, the 
consumer bid curves may be simulated through bid curve of a fictitious generator. The 
production of this fictitious generator would represent the uncovered part of demand. 
Thus, the bid curves of any participant may be deduced from a polynomial cost 
function. If the bid curves of Figure 3.2 are treated as marginal cost curves then the 
corresponding cost function has the following form: 
 
 caPPK GG += 2)(  (3.5) 
 
where a, and c are constants. It should be underlined, that the existence of the first 
degree term in (3.5) would not distort the generality of the following analysis. Hence, 
the analysis is also valid for the bid curves that are given by the dashed lines in Figure 
3.2 .  
  For any generator i the marginal cost, resulting from (3.5), is: 
 
 iGiiG PaP ,, 2)(costmarginal =  (3.6) 
 
From Figure 3.2 one may find out that the factor ia  is given by the relationship: 
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where ( ip , iP ) is any corresponding pair of the bid curve. Consider now that in case of 
zonal pricing, there is a zone consisting of bus 1 and bus 2. Both of them are generation 
buses. If the generation limit at these two buses is not reached then the two generators 
should operate with the same marginal cost in order to face same nodal price. Thus, it 
is: 
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The (3.8) is the additional restriction which has to be incorporated in the OPF so as to 
obtain the same nodal prices for the buses 1 and 2. Consequently, the OPF will be 
formulated as: 
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where  
f: equality restrictions for nodal power balance 
g: inequality restrictions of the power system 
z: zonal pricing restriction for the buses 1 and 2 
The Lagrange function, which corresponds to (3.9), is as follows: 
 
 ),()()()()( 2,1, GGG PPzKL ξ+++= xµgxλfPx  (3.10) 
 
where  
ξ: Lagrange multiplier for the zonal pricing restriction 
 
At the optimal point, according to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, it is: 
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 ),()()()(0 2,1, GGG PPzK xxxx xgµxfλP ∇+∇+∇+∇= ξ  (3.11) 
 
The (3.11) facilitates the determination of a market equilibrium given the restriction of 
same nodal prices for all generators participating in a zone. This common nodal price 
can be found by taking the derivatives of (3.11) with respect to 1GP  and 2GP . Thus, it 
is: 
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From both (3.12a) and (3.12b) it is obvious that the price which has to be adopted as 
common nodal price for the buses 1 and 2 is the expectedλ . This price is equal to their 
common marginal cost and so it will be accepted from both participants. 
  It is important to underline that now the Lagrange multipliers 1λ  and 2λ  cannot be 
used as nodal prices for the buses 1 and 2. Both (3.12a) and (3.12b) highlight that 
21,λλ  are different than the corresponding bid of the two producers, which is equal to 
the expectedλ . However, it can be shown that there is a fixed relationship between 
21,λλ  and expectedλ . By multiplying (3.12a) by 12 / aa  and then adding it into the 
(3.12b) it is: 
3.3  Analysis of the Norwegian market using AC- OPF 73
 
  
⇒
+
+
=⇒+=+⇒
⇒−++=+
1
)1(
1
2
21
1
2
expected21
1
2
expected
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
expectedexpected
1
2
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
λλ
λλλλ
ξλξλλλ
  
 
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
expected
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
+
+
=⇒
λλ
λ  (3.13) 
 
 The (3.13) can be generalized for n generators participating in a zone as follows: 
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  Consequently, the common marginal cost expectedλ  is the weighted average of the 
Lagrange multipliers iλ . At this point it should be underlined that (3.14) holds if the 
production limits of generators participating in a zone are not reached. If such limits are 
reached then (3.14) is affected by the corresponding Lagrange multiplier µ. However, it 
is necessary to mention that (3.14) is not needed in order to calculate the common 
marginal cost. This aim is served by the additional restriction introduced into the OPF. 
Once the power output of a generator participating into a zone is obtained, as co-product 
of OPF, the marginal cost can be estimated from the bid curve of this generator. The 
usefulness of (3.14) is consisting of showing that there is a standard relationship 
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between the Lagrange multipliers, of the buses belonging to a zone, and their common 
marginal cost given that the production constraints are not active. 
 
3.4 Numerical results 
 
  The analysis which is presented in Section 3.3 provides the necessary methods in order 
to assess the Norwegian market operation mode. The use of these methods will be 
highlighted using a 10-bus test system which is illustrated in Figure 3.4 .The market, 
which is presented by this system, consists of four suppliers and four consumers. The 
participants’ bids have the form which is shown in Figure 3.2. The network data as well 
as the market players’ bids are given in Appendix B. Four different cases will be 
studied.  
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Figure 3.4 The 10-bus test system 
 
3.4.1 Unconstrained system 
 
  The assessment of the operation mode consists of calculating the deviations between 
the nodal prices obtained by AC-OPF and the prices that would be obtained if the 
system would operate as the Norwegian market.  
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  Firstly, as the procedure shown in 3.3.1 indicates, the nodal prices are calculated. The 
market operator runs an AC-OPF using the bids of Table B.2. These bids result in an 
unconstrained system situation. In Table 3.3 the calculated nodal prices are presented. 
In this phase it is necessary to define a set of loss factors so as to simulate the 
Norwegian market. Assume that the market operator adopts the loss components of 
nodal prices as loss factors.  
  Actually, that would happen in Norway if the loss factors were changed at each time 
interval and they were not kept constant, as in the reality, for a period of 6-10 weeks.  
  The bus 7 is used as reference bus for the calculation of the nodal price loss 
components. The nodal price of this bus is at the middle of the price spectrum. So, the 
choice of this bus as reference bus leads in positive as well as negative loss components. 
This fact reflects the situation in Norway where both positive and negative loss factors 
may be announced. Moreover, at bus 7 a generator with large capacity is located. 
Therefore, the nodal price of bus 7 is chosen as reference price. The calculated loss 
components are included in the third column of Table 3.3. These components are now 
used as loss factors. 
 
Table 3.3 
Unconstrained case. Loss components as loss factors. 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus Nodal price AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal price 
DC 
Net price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC 
1 2.9296 -0.0234 2.9174 2.9408 0.0112 
2 2.9527 -0.0003 2.9174 2.9177 -0.0350 
3 2.9427 -0.0103 2.9174 2.9277 -0.0150 
4 2.9565 0.0035 2.9174 2.9139 -0.0426 
5 2.9633 0.0103 2.9174 2.9277 -0.0356 
6 2.9526 -0.0004 2.9174 2.9170 -0.0356 
7 2.9530 0.0000 2.9174 2.9174 -0.0356 
8 2.9609 0.0079 2.9174 2.9408 -0.0201 
9 2.9683 0.0153 2.9174 2.9177 -0.0506 
10 2.9680 0.0150 2.9174 2.9277 -0.0403 
 
  The next stage is the modification of the original bid curves of the players according to 
the loss factors. After this point the procedure simulates the Norwegian market. The 
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market operator receives the ultimate bid curves and runs a DC-OPF. The resulting 
nodal prices are shown in Table 3.3 in the fourth column. Since there is no congestion 
these prices are equal. However, the final prices that the market participants face come 
up after the subtraction of loss factors from the nodal DC prices. 
  The net DC prices represent the market situation as it would be formed by the 
Norwegian market operation mode. The deviations of those prices from the nodal 
prices, resulting by AC-OPF, are given in the last column of Table 3.3. 
  The differences are small but it should be considered that there is no congestion and 
the loss factors are based on the real AC situation. In the real world the same factors are 
used for more than 2000 time intervals during the ten-week period. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, in the most cases, the constant loss factors are not 
associated with the changing real AC situation. Therefore, the operation mode 
assessment is made again. 
 
Table 3.4 
Unconstrained case. Randomly chosen loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus 
Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as % 
of nodal 
price 
Nodal price
DC 
Net price
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC
1 2.9296 0.1465 +5 2.9707 2.8242 -0.1054 
2 2.9527 0.0591 +2 2.9707 2.9116 -0.0411 
3 2.9427 0 0 2.9707 2.9707 0.0280 
4 2.9565 -0.0887 -3 2.9707 3.0594 0.1029 
5 2.9633 0.0593 +2 2.9707 3.0300 0.0667 
6 2.9526 0.1181 +4 2.9707 3.0888 0.1362 
7 2.9530 0 0 2.9707 2.9707 0.0177 
8 2.9609 0 0 2.9707 2.9707 0.0098 
9 2.9683 -0.1781 -6 2.9707 2.7926 -0.1757 
10 2.9680 0.1187 +4 2.9707 3.0894 0.1214 
 
This time, the loss factors are randomly chosen. In Norwegian market the loss factors 
are up to 10% of the nodal price. Such factors may be positive as well as negative. 
Table 3.4 illustrates, in the third column, the randomly chosen factors. The market 
operator runs again the DC-OPF and calculates the nodal DC prices. Then the net prices 
are announced to the market players. As can be seen, in the last column of Table 3.4, the 
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deviations from the AC nodal prices are now larger. This case study reveals that even in 
the absence of congestion and zonal pricing, a deviation from the AC nodal prices may 
be expected.  
 
3.4.2 Constrained system without zonal pricing 
 
  Consider a reduction of the power transfer limit of line 7-8 to 94 MVA, the 
participants’ bids that are given in Table B.2 result in a congested situation. The power 
flow restriction, considering the line 7-8, is binding.  
  In Norway the existence of congestion leads to a splitting in different zones. For the 
research purpose, it is interesting to compare the congested AC nodal prices with the 
prices obtained by the Norwegian operation mode but without using zonal pricing.  
  So, assume that each node is a different zone. The calculated AC nodal prices as well 
as their loss components are given in Table 3.5. These components are used as loss 
factors and they modify the participants’ bids. As discussed before, the market operator 
runs a DC-OPF, calculates the DC nodal prices and announces the net nodal prices. The 
differences between AC nodal prices and the DC net prices are given in the last column 
of Table 3.5. A comparison of these deviations to the ones given in Table 3.3 indicates 
that in case of congestion the differences are larger.  
 
Table 3.5 
Constrained case, without zonal pricing. Loss components as loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus Nodal price AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal price 
DC 
Net price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC 
1 2.9340 -0.0242 2.9160 2.9402 0.0062 
2 3.1140 -0.0098 3.0620 3.0718 -0.0422 
3 3.2570 0.0026 3.1770 3.1796 -0.0774 
4 2.7890 -0.0113 2.7700 2.7813 -0.0077 
5 3.1680 0.0056 3.0920 3.0976 -0.0704 
6 3.4030 0.0144 3.2930 3.3074 -0.0956 
7 2.3800 0.0000 2.3950 2.3950 0.0150 
8 3.6250 0.0120 3.4950 3.5070 -0.1180 
9 3.5590 0.0200 3.4610 3.4810 -0.0780 
10 3.5450 0.0198 3.4130 3.4328 -0.1122 
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Table 3.6 
Constrained case, without zonal pricing. Randomly chosen loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus 
Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as % 
of nodal 
price 
Nodal price
DC 
Net price
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC
1 2.9340 0.0880 +3 2.9391 2.8511 -0.0829 
2 3.1140 -0.1246 -4 2.9909 3.1155 0.0015 
3 3.2570 0 0 3.0318 3.0318 -0.2252 
4 2.7890 0.0558 +2 2.8816 2.8258 0.0368 
5 3.1680 -0.0950 -3 3.0025 2.9075 -0.2605 
6 3.4030 0.1702 +5 3.0775 3.2477 -0.1553 
7 2.3800 0 0 2.7327 2.7327 0.3527 
8 3.6250 0 0 3.1579 3.1579 -0.4671 
9 3.5590 0.2135 +6 3.1432 3.3567 -0.2023 
10 3.5450 0.0355 +1 3.1247 3.1602 -0.3848 
 
  Following the same procedure as in section 3.4.1, instead of the nodal price loss 
components, randomly chosen loss factors may be used. The corresponding loss factors 
as well as the comparison results are given in Table 3.6. It is evident that, in this case, 
the differences are essentially higher. Such differences are more likely to appear 
because the loss factors are not associated with the real AC situation.  
 
3.4.3 Constrained system considering zonal pricing 
 
  The third case consists of applying zonal pricing in the previous congested case. 
Assume that buses 1 and 2 form a zone while all the other buses remain as single-bus 
zones. Firstly, the AC nodal prices, shown in Table 3.7, are calculated.  
  As can be seen, the prices for buses 1 and 2 are equal because the zonal pricing 
restriction has been incorporated in the AC-OPF. The loss components of those prices 
are given in the second column. These components are used as loss factors by the pool 
operator. The pool operator runs a DC OPF demanding same nodal price for bus 1 and 
2. The resulting prices as well as the net prices are also given in Table 3.7. The 
deviations are, generally, higher than in the previous case where the zonal pricing was 
not incorporated. 
3.4  Numerical results 79
Table 3.7 
Constrained case considering, zonal pricing. Loss components as loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus Nodal price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal price 
DC 
Net price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC 
1 2.9956 0.0248 2.9670 2.9422 -0.0534 
2 2.9956 -0.1010 2.9670 3.0680 0.0724 
3 3.2620 0.0030 3.1740 3.1770 -0.0850 
4 2.7870 -0.0115 2.7770 2.7885 0.0015 
5 3.1720 0.0059 3.0920 3.0979 -0.0741 
6 3.4100 0.0148 3.2860 3.3008 -0.1092 
7 2.3720 0.0000 2.4090 2.4090 0.0370 
8 3.6360 0.0124 3.4850 3.4974 -0.1386 
9 3.6090 0.0204 3.4510 3.4714 -0.1376 
10 3.5540 0.0202 3.4040 3.4242 -0.1298 
 
Table 3.8 
Constrained case considering, zonal pricing. Randomly chosen loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as % 
of nodal 
price 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price 
AC 
1 2.9956 0.2097 +7 3.0150 2.8053 -0.1903 
2 2.9956 0.2396 +8 3.0924 2.8528 -0.1428 
3 3.2620 0 0 3.1533 3.1533 -0.1087 
4 2.7870 -0.0836 -3 2.9292 3.0128 0.2258 
5 3.1720 0.1586 +5 3.1095 3.2681 0.0961 
6 3.4100 0.2046 +6 3.2215 3.4261 0.0161 
7 2.3720 0 0 2.7071 2.7071 0.3351 
8 3.6360 0 0 3.3415 3.3415 -0.2945 
9 3.6090 0.2526 +7 3.3211 3.5737 -0.0353 
10 3.5540 0.0355 +1 3.2919 3.3274 -0.2266 
 
  By choosing loss factors different from the loss components, these deviations are 
increased, as it is indicated in Table 3.8. 
 
3.4.4 Constrained system. Intensive zonal pricing 
 
  The last case describes a situation where a more intensive zonal pricing is applied, i.e. 
more buses participate in some zones. In particular, the four generator buses form one 
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zone. A second zone consists of the four consumer buses. The buses 3 and 8 remain 
single-bus zones. The results of this case are presented in Table 3.9. The loss 
components have been used as loss factors. It is obvious, that the differences, 
considering the great majority of the buses, are essentially higher than in the case 
described in Section 3.4.3. 
 
Table 3.9 
Constrained case, intensive zonal pricing. Loss components as loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus Nodal price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal price 
DC 
Net price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC 
1 2.7780 0.0026 2.8380 2.8354 0.0574 
2 2.7780 0.0117 2.8380 2.8263 0.0483 
3 3.5860 0.0221 3.2590 3.2811 -0.3049 
4 2.7780 0.0059 2.8380 2.8321 0.0541 
5 3.9320 0.0205 3.4480 3.4685 -0.4635 
6 3.9320 0.0257 3.4480 3.4737 -0.4583 
7 2.7780 0 2.8380 2.8380 0.0600 
8 4.3500 0.0121 3.6900 3.7021 -0.6479 
9 3.9320 0.0269 3.4480 3.4749 -0.4571 
10 3.9320 0.0258 3.4480 3.4738 -0.4582 
 
Table 3.10 
Constrained case, intensive zonal pricing. Randomly chosen loss factors 
(All values in ct/kWh) 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as % 
of nodal 
price 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price DC- 
Nodal price AC
1 2.7780 0.1111 +4 2.8427 2.7316 -0.0464 
2 2.7780 0.0556 +6 2.8427 2.7871 0.0091 
3 3.5860 0 0 3.1960 3.1960 -0.3900 
4 2.7780 -0.1389 -5 2.8427 2.9816 0.2036 
5 3.9320 0.3146 +8 3.3554 3.6700 -0.2620 
6 3.9320 0.2359 +6 3.3554 3.5913 -0.3407 
7 2.7780 0 0 2.8427 2.8427 0.0647 
8 4.3500 0 0 3.5570 3.5570 -0.7930 
9 3.9320 0.0786 +2 3.3554 3.4340 -0.4980 
10 3.9320 0.3146 +8 3.3554 3.6700 -0.2620 
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  In case of more intensive zonal pricing, a set of randomly chosen loss factors may be 
applied. Both loss factors and resulting differences are given in Table 3.10. Some buses 
have increased differences while the deviations at other buses are reduced. The 
comparison is made between the differences that are given in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10.  
  A general comparison between the four cases, when randomly chosen loss factors are 
used, is not proper. In this case, an average deviation resulting by many different set of 
random factors would be a more appropriate approach. However, it is reasonable to 
compare the deviations in the case that the loss components have been used as loss 
factors. Such a comparison leads to the conclusion that the more administrative rules, 
such as loss factors and zonal pricing, are incorporated the higher the deviations from 
the AC nodal prices are.  
  It is also possible to make a further statement for the influence that the different rules 
have on the deviation of net prices from the AC nodal prices. For this purpose the 
differences presented in the last column of Tables 3.7, 3.9 and 3.10 are considered. The 
Table 3.7 corresponds to a not intensive zonal pricing. On the other hand Table 3.9 
illustrates an intensive zonal pricing case. Table 3.10 corresponds also to intensive 
zonal pricing but in this case, differently as in Tables 3.7 and 3.9, randomly chosen loss 
factors have been used. It is obvious that the change from not intensive to intensive 
zonal pricing has larger influence on the deviations of net prices from AC nodal prices 
(shown as differences in Tables 3.7 and 3.9) than the change from the use of loss 
components as loss factors to the use of randomly chosen loss factors (shown as 
differences in Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Thus, the conclusion that one may draw is that the 
deviations of net prices in Norway from the AC nodal prices are mostly caused by the 
use of zonal pricing. The way that the loss factors are defined, same factors for a period 
of 6-10 weeks, has a secondary role to these deviations. 
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Chapter 4 
Fixed cost allocation using 
game theory 
 
 
 
  The term fixed costs, generally, embraces the capital invested to build the network as 
well as the network maintenance costs. In a monopoly market, the utility covers those 
costs through the tariff policy. In the modern deregulated electricity markets, the 
network operation is the responsibility of the ISO. However, the company which is the 
network owner must still be compensated for those fixed costs. Hence, the ISO has to 
charge the market participants so as to collect the necessary amount.  
  In the liberalized power markets, the issue of charging the participants, regarding the 
fixed costs, is of great significance. The reason is that the fixed costs make up the 
largest part of transmission charges. Hence, it is easy to explain the demand for a fair 
and effective allocation of those costs to the market participants [31]. Discrimination 
policies, by assigning unreasonable high use-of-network charges, could be applied in 
order to prevent some market participants to access a part or even the whole network. 
Such policies cancel the isonomy, introduced by law in all deregulated markets, 
regarding the network access. 
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  Several methods have been proposed aiming at a proper allocation of fixed costs [72]. 
These methods are well established from an engineering point of view but some of them 
may fail to send the right economical signals.  
  The allocation of embedded costs, i.e., the fixed costs, is a typical case where the 
cooperation between some agents produces economies of scale. Consequently, the 
resulting benefits have to be shared among the participating agents. The cooperative 
game theory concepts, taking into account the economies of scale, suggest reasonable 
allocations that may be economically efficient. The analysis in this research will 
illustrate the use of game theory in the fixed cost allocation. The incorporation of game 
theory under different market types will be investigated. Furthermore, new methods, 
considering the application of game theory, will be suggested.  
 
4.1 Game theory 
 
  Game theory is the study of multiperson decision problems. In these problems there is 
conflict of interests between people or group of people. Extending the use of game 
theory, participant in such a situation may also be considered any single individual. In 
this case, the participant is not necessary to be a human being. The term game 
corresponds to the theoretical models that describe such conflicts of interests. Game 
theory consists of analysing such conflict situations. In the most cases, the reality is too 
complicate to be described with acriby by a game, but a game could still be useful in 
order to describe the main types of movements that the participants could do and the 
various results that could come up. 
  The first paper on game theory was published in 1928 [73]. This was an investigation 
in the field of applied mathematic. But it was later in 1944 that the game theory was 
established as an autonomous field in mathematic [74]. In general, the situations 
investigated in the game theory may be categorized in two groups. The first group 
embraces the noncooperative games while the other group consists of the games where 
the participants may cooperate with each other.  
  The participants in a noncooperative game, as well as in a cooperative one, are called 
players. A basic assumption of game theory is that the players behave in a rational way. 
A participant is said to be rational if his aim is to maximize his payment from the game 
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taking into consideration the moves of the other players. The different decisions that a 
player may make to, during a game, are the strategies of each player. At the end of the 
game the payment received by each player is called payoff.  
  There are two alternatives to describe a noncooperative game. The first called 
extensive form and it describes, by means of a tree diagram, all the possible directions 
that a game can follow. The second alternative is called normal form. In the normal 
form representation of a game, each player, simultaneously, chooses a strategy and the 
combination of the strategies chosen by the players determines a payoff for each player. 
The normal form can be described through the paradigm shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 12h  22h  32h  
11h  0, 4 4, 0 5, 3 
21h  4, 0 0, 4 5, 3 
31h  3, 5 3, 5 6, 6 
 
Figure 4.1 Normal form of a game 
 
  The numbers in the left of each cell, in payoff matrix of Figure 4.1, represent the 
payment that player Η1 will receive by choosing the corresponding strategy, given that 
player Η2 will choose the strategy which corresponds to this column. If the players 
choose the pair of strategies ( 11h , 12h ) this will lead to the pair of payoffs (0, 4) .  
  A solution to this game can be given by the maximin criterion. According to this 
criterion, the players are naturally pessimistic and so they try to find the best defence 
against their opponent. The player Η1 looks, for each of his three strategies, which is 
the minimum payoff that he can expect. For the strategy ih1 , this task is formulated as 
follows: 
 
 3,2,1),2,1(min 1 =jhhu jihj  (4.1) 
 
Player Η1 
Player Η2 
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where  
)2,1(1 jih hhu :  payoff to player Η1 for the pair of strategies (i, j) 
 
  Between all of these minima, player Η1 chooses the strategy i which guarantees him 
the highest of these minima.  
 
 3,2,1,),2,1(minmax 1 =jihhu jihji  (4.2) 
 
So, the player Η1 maximizes his minimum expectation. For the game described above, 
the maximin criterion leads player Η1 to adopt the strategy 31h  (expecting a minimal 
payoff of 3) while the player Η2 chooses the strategy 32h  (expecting also a minimal 
payoff of 3). However, the payoff to both of them (6) is higher than the expected 
payment which is guaranteed by the maximin criterion (3).  
  Another solution for a noncooperative game is the Nash equilibrium [75]. According 
to this solution concept, each player will choose as strategy the best response to the 
optimal strategies of the other players. Consider a game },...,;,...,{ 11 nn uuSTSTG =  
where iST  is the set of strategies of the i-th player and iu  is the payoff to the i-th 
player. A group of strategies ),...,( **1 nstst  is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i the 
strategy *ist  is the best response of i to the optimal strategies of the n-1 other players 
),...,,,...,( ** 1
*
1
*
1 nii stststst +− .  
Thus, it is: 
 
iiniiiiniiii STststststststustststststu ∈∀≥ +−+− ),,...,,,,...(),...,,,,...,( ** 1* 1*1** 1** 1*1     (4.3) 
 
Hence, strategy *ist  is the solution to the following optimization problem: 
 
 ),...,,,,...,(max ** 1
*
1
*
1 niiiiSTst
stststststu
ii
+−∈
 (4.4) 
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The Nash equilibrium may be further explained using the well-known game of the 
prisoners’ dilemma. The payoff matrix of these game is given in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
-1, -1 -9, 0 
0, -9 -6, -6 
 
Figure 4.2 The prisoners’ dilemma 
 
  In this game, two prisoners are interrogated for the same crime. They are held in 
different rooms so as to have no contact with each other. If one of them confesses while 
the other remains silent then the former is released and the latter is getting a sentence of 
9 months. If both of them confess then they should stay in jail for 6 months and in case 
that they both remain silent then they are getting a sentence of 1 month. Investigating 
this game, in order to find the Nash equilibrium, it is obvious that for each player the 
best strategy is to confess, no matter what the opponent will do. Consequently, the Nash 
equilibrium of this game is the pair of strategies (confess, confess). The corresponding 
pair of payoffs is (-6, -6). However, it is clear from the payoff matrix that this pair of 
payoffs is not the optimal that the two prisoners could achieve. It is obvious from the 
payoff matrix that the best solution for both of them would be to remain silent and get a 
sentence of just 1 month. This solution would be achieved if there were a contact, a 
cooperation, between the two prisoners. Such situations are investigated within the 
framework of cooperative game theory. 
 
4.2 Cooperative game theory 
 
  The players participating in a cooperative game have the possibility to contact the 
other participants, so as to ensure a higher payoff than if they would act alone. The 
noncooperative game theory aims to describe the behaviour of players. On the other 
silence confess
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
silence 
confess 
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hand, the cooperative game theory has rather a prescriptive character. Cooperative game 
theory does not target to describe the players’ behaviour. Rather, it sets reasonable rules 
of allocation, or suggests indices in order to measure power. Therefore it is a challenge 
to use this theory in order to deal with the power systems’ fixed cost allocation problem, 
especially because it can provide single-point solutions.  
 
4.2.1 Terminology of cooperative game theory 
 
  The set of players participating in a cooperative game is given as { }nN ,...,2,1= . A 
cooperation between some players is possible to be established and so a coalition will 
form. A coalition S is then any subset of the set of players N, NS ⊂ . 
  When some players form a coalition S, it is assumed that they act as they were one 
player. The aim of the coalition members is to play a jointly set of strategies, aiming at 
maximizing the sum of payoffs to the players of the coalition. The next step is to 
allocate this sum between the members of the coalition.  
  The worst case for the players participating in a coalition S is, the rest of the players to 
form a coalition N-S and act against the players of coalition S. In this case the initial 
cooperative game with n players is transformed to a noncooperative game with two 
players, the S and the N-S. Using the maximin criterion it is possible to calculate the 
maximum payoff that the coalition S can now ensure itself. One may now define the 
characteristic function v of a cooperative game as the function which assigns to each 
coalition S the largest payoff that the coalition S can guarantee itself. Coalition S may 
obtain this payoff by coordinating the strategies which are available to its members. So 
if Sst  is a vector of strategies played by the players of coalition S and SN −st  is a 
vector of strategies played by the players participating in coalition N-S, then it is: 
 
 SNSNSS
n
i
SNSi STSTuSv
S
SNS
−−
=
− ∈∈= ∑
−
stststst
stst
,,),(minmax)(
1
 (4.5) 
where : 
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v(S): value of characteristic function for the coalition S 
Sn : the number of players participating in coalition S 
iu : the payoff to player i 
SST : the set of all strategies available to players of coalition S 
SNST − : the set of all strategies available to players of coalition N-S 
 
  A game is called superadditive if its characteristic function holds the following 
condition: 
 
 φ=Θ∩⊂Θ∀Θ+≥Θ∪ SifNSvSvSv ,,),()()(  (4.6) 
where : 
S,Θ: disjoint subsets of the set of players N 
 
  The (4.6) states, that the payoff which the union of S and Θ can guarantee itself is at 
least equal to the sum of payoffs obtained by S and Θ playing alone. For all the subsets 
of N if the equality holds in (4.6), then it is indifferent for the players to form any 
coalition and the game is called inessential: 
 
φ=Θ∩∈Θ∀Θ+=Θ∪ SifNSvSvSv ,,),()()(  (4.7) 
 
In this case the characteristic function v is just additive. For the inessential games it is: 
 
 ∑
=
= n
i
ivNv
1
)()(  (4.8) 
where: 
v(N): the value of characteristic function for the grand coalition N 
v(i): the value of the characteristic function for the player I 
 
A game which is not inessential and satisfies (4.6) is called essential. 
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   It is important to investigate which coalitions are likely to form and how a coalition 
shares its payoff between the participating players. It is assumed that the important part 
of a cooperative game are the negotiations before the game begins, where coalitions 
form and the payoffs from the game are shared out. It is clear, that the way the payoffs 
are distributed influences also the formation of the coalitions. This happens because 
some players may try to attract some other players, in order to join their coalition, by 
promising them some extra amount. Any single player prefers to join the coalition 
which can guarantee to this player the highest payoff. Thus, it is not possible to make a 
prognosis of which coalitions are likely to form without knowing the way the payoffs 
are distributed. 
   The players are going to accept only reasonable payoffs. These payoffs should satisfy 
some certain conditions. The set of reasonable payoffs which can be rewarded to the 
players of a cooperative game are called imputations. A vector ),....,,( 21 nyyy=y , 
representing payoffs to the single players, is an imputation if it holds the following two 
conditions: 
 
 ∑
=
=n
i
i Nvy
1
)(  (4.9a) 
 niforivyi ,...,2,1),( =≥  (4.9b) 
 
  The condition in (4.9a) indicates that the sum of all payoffs should be equal to the 
value that the grand coalition can guarantee itself. This is called global rationality and it 
is also known as a Pareto optimality condition. Pareto optimality means that it is 
impossible to move from y to another vector of payoffs k with all the players having an 
increased payoff. The second condition is called individual rationality. Its explanation is 
that each player would accept as payoff from the game an amount which is at least 
equal to the amount that the player can guarantee itself by playing alone.  
  Since the imputations satisfy the global rationality condition, it is not possible that an 
imputation y can give a higher payment to each player Ni ∈  than any other imputation 
k. It is trivial to see that if for some players is ii ky >  then it must be at least one player 
j with jj ky < . The reason is that the following condition holds: 
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 (4.10) 
 
  For a coalition S it might be possible that y gives higher payoff to each member of the 
coalition than k. In order to say that y dominates k over a coalition S two conditions 
must be satisfied: 
 
 Siky ii ∈∀> ,  (4.11a) 
 )(
1
Svy
Sn
i
i ≤∑
=
 (4.11b) 
 
  While (4.11a) is simple to understand, (4.11b) calls for further explanation. Assume 
that a coalition S wants to dominate over other coalitions by promising high payoffs to 
its members. In this case coalition S should be able to ensure to each of its members the 
payoff iy  that it promises. 
 
4.2.2 The core 
 
  One of the first solutions suggested for cooperative games is the core concept [76]. 
The core is based on the concept of domination of imputations. According to the core 
concept, an imputation will be favourable in the negotiations’ phase if it is not 
dominated. The core of a game with characteristic function v , denoted by CR(v), is the 
set of all the imputations that are not dominated over any coalition. An imputation y, in 
order to belong to the core, must satisfy the following two conditions: 
 
 ∑
=
=n
i
i Nvy
1
)(  (4.12a) 
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 NSSvy
Sn
j
j ⊂∀≥∑
=
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1
 (4.12b) 
 
  The former is the global rationality while the latter is the coalitional rationality. Thus, 
if an imputation y belongs to the core then there are two possibilities for any coalition S 
which forms. Either coalition S concerns the y as the best solution or if it prefers 
another imputation k it has not the strength to enforce the change. The explanation of 
this statement is that since y belongs to the core then it is not dominated over any 
coalition. Hence, y is also not dominated over S. Thus, if an imputation k would 
dominate y over S then it should be: 
 
 )(,
11
SvykSiyk
SS n
i
i
n
i
iii ≥≥⇒∈∀> ∑∑
==
 (4.13) 
 
But the condition in (4.13) conflicts the condition in (4.11b), that means k exceeds the 
v(S), and so the imputation k cannot dominate y over the coalition S. The core of a 
game may include more than one imputations. A disadvantage of the core concept is 
that some games have an empty core.  
  Suppose that there is a cooperative game with three players, N=(1,2,3). Geometrically, 
the imputations can be represented as triples of barycentric coordinates of points in a 
triangle, as Figure 4.3 illustrates. For any point in triangle 123∆ , its barycentric 
coordinates are the payoffs to the players of the game. That is, the closer a point is to a 
vertex the larger the payoff is to the corresponding player. Hence, an imputation must 
satisfy the inequalities of (4.12b) in order to be in the core. The lines iγ  represent the 
characteristic function values of the corresponding coalitions, i.e. the points belonging 
to these lines have a constant sum regarding the payoffs of the corresponding players. 
This sum is equal to the characteristic function value of the coalition which consists of 
those players. Then the imputations belonging to the core, in order to satisfy (4.12b), 
must be closer to the sides of the triangle than the corresponding lines. Thus, assuming 
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that for any player i  it is 0)( =iv , geometrically the core of the game is the area which 
is bounded from the three lines iγ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Geometrical representation of a three-person game 
 
4.2.3 The nucleolus 
 
  From Figure 4.3, it is clear that the core may include more than one imputation. 
Actually, when the core is not empty then either it has only one imputation or it 
embraces an infinite number of imputations. The former occurs when the interaction of 
the lines iγ  is a single point and the latter in all the other cases. 
  The nucleolus concept was introduced in order to choose a single solution among all 
the imputations belonging to the core [77, 82]. Every game has only one nucleolus and 
if the core exists the nucleolus is part of it. The nucleolus is based on the idea of making 
the most unhappy coalition under it happier than the most unhappy coalition under any 
other imputation. For a coalition S measure of its unhappiness is the excess e(S): 
 
3 
2 1 
)3,1(2 v=γ
imputations 
core 
)2,1(3 v=γ
)3,2(1 v=γ
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  Thus, y(S) is the sum of payoffs that the imputation y shares out to the members of 
coalition S. Since y is an imputation which belongs to the core then from (4.12b) one 
finds out that the excess e(S) is either zero or negative. This excess shows how much 
more could expect a coalition S from the imputation y in comparison to what it can 
guarantee itself. Thus, the more near to zero, means larger, the excess e(S) is, the more 
unhappy the coalition is with this imputation.  
  Define )(yθ  to be the n2  values v(S)- y(S) for all coalitions S, including the grand 
coalition N and the empty set ∅, sorted in decreasing numerical order. Two imputations 
y and k may be compared by looking at the coalition which is unhappiest under each of 
them. Assume that they are the coalitions S and Θ respectively. Then calculating the 
excesses v(S)- y(S), as well as v(Θ)- k(Θ), the smaller the excess is the better the 
imputation. If these two excesses are equal then the next pair of the most unhappy 
coalitions is compared. The two vectors )(yθ  and )(kθ  can be ordered 
lexicographically, means as in a dictionary, so as to be: 
 
 ))(,...,)(,)(()( 221 nyyy θθθθ =y  (4.15) 
 
Then it is: 
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According to (4.16), the nucleolus, denoted by N(v), is the smallest imputation from all 
the imputations which belong to the core. 
 
 { })(,)()(:)()( vCRvCRvN ∈∀<∈= kkyy θθ  (4.17) 
 
  A hypothetical game, which has just four imputations ε, k, y, and ζ belonging to the 
core, will better clarify the concept of nucleolus. Assume that the most unhappy 
coalitions under each of these four imputations are the S, Θ, Ε, Ζ respectively. The 
excesses corresponding to these coalitions are v(S)-ε(S)=-10, v(Θ)-k(Θ)=-11, v(Ε)-
y(Ε)=-2 and v(Ζ)-ζ(Ζ)=-8. Figure 4.4 shows these four differences on the axis of the 
real numbers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 On nucleolus explanation 
 
 From Figure 4.4, one finds out that the nucleolus of the game is the imputation k. As 
can be seen, this imputation makes the most unhappy coalition under it, in this case the 
coalition Θ, happier than the most unhappy coalition under any other imputation.  
  A disadvantage of the nucleolus is that it is not monotonic. Monotonic means that 
when the characteristic function value v(S) of a coalition increases then the payoff to 
the members of this coalition is getting larger. 
  Although that nucleolus has been defined through the lexicography ordering of 
imputations, this procedure cannot be used to calculate the nucleolus. This happens 
because of the infinite number of imputations belonging to the core when it contains 
more than one imputation. For that reason, an iterative procedure based on linear 
programming has been proposed in order to compute the nucleolus of a game [78].  
0 -2 -8-10-11 
v(S)-ε(S) v(Θ)-k(Θ) v(Ζ)-ζ(Ζ) v(Ε)-y(Ε) 
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  The first stage of this procedure has as objective to minimize the largest, considering 
all the coalitions, of the excess values. From (4.14) it is obvious that the excesses are 
less than zero since (4.12b) holds. 
 
 
)()(
)()(..
min
0
NvNy
SveSyts
e
=
Σ∀≥+  (4.18) 
 
where { }φ≠⊂=Σ SNS :0 . The value resulted by solving the first iteration is 1e . 
The set of imputation resulting in 1e  is denoted by 
1Y . In case that the solution is not 
unique, that is 1Y  includes more than one imputations, the problem of (4.18) is solved 
again. In this case the active inequality constraints are fixed into equality constraints. 
Denote by { }1101 )()(: YySveSyS ∈∀=+Σ∈=Σ  the set of coalitions where the 
constraint is active. Then , the second stage is formed as: 
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 (4.19) 
 
where { }101 Σ−Σ=Σ . The optimal value of the second stage is 2e  and the set of 
optimal solutions is 2Y . If there is no unique solution the linear programming is 
repeated. Generally, by the j-th iteration it will be: 
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This procedure is terminated when jY  contains a unique solution and enables the 
calculation of nucleolus.  
 
4.2.4 The Shapley Value 
 
  The core concept, as well as the nucleolus one, shows the payoff vectors that are likely 
to persist during the phase of negotiations, before the game begins. Earlier than these 
two concepts, the Shapley value has been proposed as solution of a cooperative game 
[79]. This value, denoted by )(viϕ  for the i-th player, calculates what a player could 
reasonably expect before the game has begun. For the foundation of this value, three 
axioms has been settled:  
 
A1-Symmetry: )(viϕ  is independent of the labelling of the players. So, for each 
permutation π  of the n game players if πv is the characteristic function of the 
permuted game, with the players numbers permuted by π , then it is:  
 
 )()()( vv ii ϕπϕ π =  (4.21) 
 
A2-Efficiency: The sum of the expectations must be equal to the characteristic function 
value for the grand coalition N: 
 
 )()(
1
Nvv
n
i
i =∑
=
ϕ  (4.22) 
 
A3-Additivity: Suppose there are two games with characteristic functions v1 and v2 
respectively. Then the sum of expectations, by these two games, for each player must be 
equal to the value which would be calculated if both the games would be played 
together: 
 
 )2()1()21( vvvv iii ϕϕϕ +=+  (4.23) 
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In [79] it has been proved that the only function which satisfies these three axioms is the 
following one: 
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ϕ  (4.24) 
 
The value )(viϕ  in (4.24) is known as the Shapley value. In order to interpret (4.24) 
assume that the players participate in the game one after another in random sequence. 
Additionally, assume that each player receives a payoff equal to his contribution to the 
increase of characteristic function value of the coalition which he joins. Then the 
Shapley value for a player i is the sum of these payoffs taking into account all the 
coalitions which include this player. The fraction in (4.24) represents the probability 
that first participate in the game the 1−Sn  players of a coalition S, followed by the 
player i and then participate the rest Snn −  players. 
Another form of the Shapley value is: 
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This second form is used in the literature by the definition of some other values while 
the Shapley value is usually described by (4.24). 
  In contrast to the nucleolus solution, the Shapley value exhibits monotonicity. 
 
4.2.5 The Solidarity Value 
 
  The Shapley value concept seems to be a very attractive solution for the cooperative 
games because it gives a single solution and it is axiomatically founded. Therefore, a 
number of other values, based on the Shapley value, have been developed during the 
last decades. The Solidarity value attempts to support the weaker participants of a game 
[80]. Looking at (4.24) one finds out that the dummy players have a zero Shapley value. 
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Dummy is a characterisation for the players who contribute nothing to any of the 
coalitions where these players participate. Hence, a dummy player will be described by:  
 
 { } NSSviSv ⊂∀=∪ ,)()(  (4.26) 
 
In order to support such dummy players and, in general, the weaker players of a game, 
the solidarity value uses the average marginal contribution )(SAv  of a coalition S 
instead of the marginal contribution of a player i: 
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Using (4.27) the Solidarity value )(viψ  of a player i is defined as follows:  
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The solidarity value satisfies also the axioms of symmetry, efficiency and additivity. 
 
4.2.6 The Owen Value 
 
  The Owen value has been introduced in order to take into consideration games with 
coalitional structure [81]. That is, before the game begins there are a priori coalitions 
between some players. Assume that there is a game with N={1,2,…,n} players and that 
there is a set J of a priori unions between the players, },...,,{ 21 mTTTJ = . 
Furthermore, let Γ={1,2,…,m} be the set of the union numbers. 
  The game is played in two phases. In the former the payoff to the unions is calculated 
through the Shapley value solution. In the second phase this payoff is allocated to the 
members of the union using again a Shapley value process. However, there is a 
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difference in this step. That is, the amount that a coalition S, which belongs to a union 
jT , could achieve by defecting the union jT  and joining any permutation of the rest 
unions it is also taken into account. The Owen value, for a player i participating in this 
game, is denoted by );( Jvyi . This value is calculated as follows:  
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where: 
π : permutation in Γ 
 j: the number of the a priori union where the player i belongs  
Sn : the number of players participating in coalition S 
Tjn : the number of players participating in the a priori union jT  
πn : the number of the unions belonging to the permutation π  
Β : the union of all the a priori unions belonging to the permutation π , qq ππ∈∪=Β  
 
From (4.29) it is obvious that the probability 
!
)!1(!
m
nmn −− ππ  corresponds to the 
phase when the game is between the a priori unions. Similarly, the probability 
!
)!1(!
Tj
STjs
n
nnn −−
 is according to the second phase of the game, between the players 
of a union. As can be seen, the marginal contribution in (4.29) reflects the possibility of 
the players to leave their a priori union and join a permutation π  of the rest unions. 
The Owen value holds the axioms of symmetry, efficiency and additivity. 
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4.3 Usage based methods 
 
  The application of game theory in fixed cost allocation aims to overcome the lack in 
economic efficiency that some already known methods have. Some of these are based 
on the marginal cost and others on the measurement of the network usage [72, 83]. The 
problem with the marginal cost based methods is that, in general, they do not fully cover 
the fixed costs. Consequently, a supplementary charge is necessary.  
  Several usage-based methods have been developed in order to deal with the task of 
allocating the fixed cost of a power system among the market participants. The 
difference between these methods is how the network usage is measured.  
 
4.3.1 The Postage Stamp Method 
 
  One of the traditional methods is the postage stamp method (PS), also known as the 
rolled-in method [84]. According to this method, the network usage from the side of a 
transaction is measured by the magnitude of the transaction iP , without taking into 
account how the transaction affects the power flows over the various lines in the 
network. The amount to be paid by transaction i is: 
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where 
K : the total cost to be covered by the market participants 
iPS : the amount charged to participant i according to the postage stamp method 
 
  Obviously, since the postage stamp method does not take distances into account, it 
leads to cross-subsidization of long-distance transactions by short-distance transactions. 
Despite this fact, this method is widely implemented because of its simplicity. 
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4.3.2 The MW-Mile Method 
 
  In order to achieve a more precise measurement of network usage, numerous methods 
based on power flow data have been developed. The MW-mile method (MWM) was the 
first such method to be introduced [85]. In order to determine the cost allocation, the 
network operator runs a power flow program for each single transaction and calculates 
the power flow due to this transaction over each system line. These power flows are 
then weighted by the specific transfer cost lC  of each branch l  which is expressed in 
€/MW. The role of lC , in the case that a pre-defined amount K  must be proportionally 
allocated to the system users, is to differentiate the use of facilities with various costs. 
Thus, in this case lC  should not be confused with a direct payment, per MW, to the 
system operator. However, lC  may be indeed interpreted as direct, per MW, payment 
when other, than proportional share of a pre-defined amount K , allocation form is 
adapted. This case will be illustrated in a following section. The usage of any branch l  
by transaction i will be: 
 
 lilli PCf ,, =  (4.31) 
 
where 
lif , : the usage of branch l  by the market participant i 
 
The absolute value in (4.31) denotes that the power flow direction is disregarded. The 
total system usage if  by transaction i is given by summing over all lines: 
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By allocating proportionally the total system cost, the contribution of transaction i will 
be: 
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where 
iMWM : the amount charged to participant i according to the MW-mile method 
 
4.3.3 The Counter Flow Method 
 
  As already stated, the MW-mile method does not consider the direction of power flow 
that each transaction causes. However, it is often argued that power flows having 
opposite direction from the net flow, which is the power flow due to all transactions, 
contribute positive in the system situation by relieving congestions and increasing the 
available transfer capacity. In order to take this fact into account, a version of MWM 
has been developed. In this version the branch usage is calculated by the following 
equation: 
 
 lilli PCf ,, =  (4.34) 
 
  Then (4.34) is used in (4.32). This allocation procedure is called the counter flow 
method and results in the payment iCF , for a participant i, using (4.33).  
 
4.3.4 The Zero Counter Flow Method 
 
  According to the counter flow method, the contribution of a transaction may be 
negative, i.e., the network operator has to pay agent i for carrying out his transaction. 
For various reasons this may not be acceptable to the network owner and/or the other 
market participants. A compromise that avoids negative contribution is the zero counter 
flow (ZCF) method. According to this method, the usage of a line by a particular 
transaction is set to zero if the power flow due to the transaction goes in the opposite 
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direction of the net flow for the line. Thus, instead of (4.31) the branch usage is 
calculated as follows: 
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The amount iZCF , to be paid by transaction i, is then found by using (4.35) as a basis 
for (4.32) and (4.33). 
 
4.4 The fixed cost allocation game 
 
  The transit from monopoly to competitive market increased the need for economic 
efficiency by the power sector operation. In this context, the cooperative game theory 
has been applied in order to achieve efficient allocations of the power system fixed 
costs. In [86, 87], an introduction in use of cooperative game theory is presented. The 
nucleolus, as well as the Shapley value, is used as solution to the corresponding game. 
Furthermore, in [88] the allocation of network expansion cost is investigated by means 
of Kernel concept. In [89], the fixed cost allocation in a pool marketplace is addressed. 
  One of the main reasons that allocations based on the cooperative game theory 
methods are attractive is that they, in many cases, belong to the core. Thereby, the 
problem of cross-subsidization, as in postage stamp, is avoided.  
 
 
4.4.1 Game definition 
 
  A general equation, which represents the usage-based cost allocations shown in 
previous section, has the form: 
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  Another alternative is to bill the participants directly for each MW which they transfer. 
In this case, the payment iR  of each market participant to the ISO is given by: 
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It is noticeable, that in (4.37) the role of specific transfer cost lC  is to directly charge 
the participants for each MW that they transfer over the branch l .  
  In both (4.36) and (4.37), the network operator calculates the amount if  as if i  were 
the only participant in marketplace using either power flow or optimal power flow 
program. Thus, the power flows liP ,  are determined considering only player i . This 
usage is called stand-alone usage. The motivation for the participants to cooperate is the 
existence of counter flows.  
  Assume that some participants agree to cooperate. Then they could benefit from 
possible counter flows. Figure 4.5 illustrates this idea. By setting the specific cost at unit 
the usage is equal to the power flow and so it can be expressed in MW. This assumption 
will hold for the whole section 4.4. It should be underlined, that the general validity of 
the following analysis is not affected by this assumption. In a following section it will 
be illustrated the use of cooperative game theory also with different specific costs for 
each branch.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Counter flow 
A B 
T1=100 MW
T2=100 MW
T3=100 MW
 4.4  The fixed cost allocation game 106
  As can be seen, for each transaction i it is MW100=if . If there is a cooperation of 
the three transactions then the measured use from the side of the coalition it will be 
MW100=coalitionf . Hence, it is : 
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 (4.38) 
 
  From (4.38) one finds out that the three participants in case of cooperation would be 
billed for 200 MW less. This is the explanation why the market participants would have 
the incentive to cooperate.  
  The next step is to allocate this benefit among the coalition members. At this point the 
incorporation of the cooperative game theory can result in a fair and acceptable 
allocation. Considering the game of the power system fixed cost allocation, the 
characteristic function v can be defined as follows:  
 
 S
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i ffSv
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)(  (4.39) 
 
where: 
Sf : usage of the network by coalition S 
 
From (4.39) is explicit that the characteristic function represents the savings that can be 
achieved in case of cooperation. It is obvious that for each player i it is 0)( =iv . Once 
the game is defined solutions may be found using the cooperative game theory concepts 
which have been described in section 4.2. Assume that the vector y represents the 
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payoffs to the players arose from the solution of the game. These payoffs are resulting 
in a reduction of if  for each player: 
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 (4.40) 
where 'if  is the new use of network or facility by player i. If the savings assigned to 
player i are larger than the original if  then the 
'
if  is set at zero. Thus, a player does not 
have the opportunity to receive money back from the network operator. The reason of 
making this adjustment is to prevent the misuse of game from the side of players. The 
'
if  is now used by (4.36) or (4.37) in order to calculate the amount that player i has to 
pay. In case of (4.37), there is an explicit reduction of the amount iR  for all the players, 
if iy  is not zero. In case of (4.36), the use of cooperative game theory may bring an 
acceptable solution concerning the different ways the players can cooperate. This point 
will be further explained in the next sections.  
 
4.4.2 The game in the case of pool market 
 
  The IEEE 14 bus system, shown already in Figure 2.6, is used as a pool marketplace. 
For this paradigm the loads have no elasticity, i.e. they have to be fully covered. The 
generators’ cost data are given in Table C.1 in Appendix C. The competition takes place 
only in generation level. Such a market may appear in the beginning of deregulation 
phase in countries where, during the monopoly period, there was only one utility 
serving the whole country. That is, in the beginning of restructuring new players must 
come in and the domination power of the ex-monopoly must be controlled. Thus, 
bilateral contracts are not allowed and the whole power is traded in a mandatory pool 
with the pool operator having a wide knowledge of the generators’ data. Greece belongs 
in this category. According to the Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy the 
mandatory pool should be online within 2004.  
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  Table 4.1 presents the consumers as well as their inelastic demand. The fixed costs 
will be allocated to the consumers because of their price inelasticity [89].  
  Assume that the loads are going to act individually. Then the pool operator determines, 
separately for each player, through an optimal power flow (OPF) which generators have 
to be dispatched to match the demand. In Table 4.2 the first four rows correspond to the 
single-player coalitions. Thus, these rows include, in the second column, the use of 
power system by each player when this player acts alone. 
 
Table 4.1 
Consumers in the pool market as players of the game 
Player Bus
Demand, 
[MW] 
1 4 40 
2 9 40 
3 13 30 
4 14 50 
 
  If the four loads are going to cooperate with each other then the possible coalitions are 
15, including the single-player coalitions. For each coalition Table 4.2 comprises its use 
of the system, as well as the characteristic function value. The characteristic function 
value of the grand coalition {1, 2, 3, 4}, i.e. the largest savings, has to be allocated to 
the four players. For this aim the Shapley value may be used. Table 4.3 presents the if  
and 'if  for each player as well as the Shapley value )(viϕ . 
  The allocation of fixed cost may also take place at the level of each single system 
branch. In this case if  denotes the power flow over a particular branch caused by 
player i. The problem by realising the single branch game in a pool market is that 
negative characteristic function values may arise for some coalitions. The explanation 
of these negative values is that when a coalition forms the dispatched generators may be 
different from the generators dispatched to meet the demand of single players. Thus, the 
power flow over some branches may be also larger than the sum of if . Considering the 
whole system, the formation of each coalition results in savings.  
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Table 4.2 
Use and savings for the game in pool market 
coalition Sf  [MW] v(S) [MW] 
1 82.53 0 
2 158.99 0 
3 133.81 0 
4 229.09 0 
3,4 332.45 30.44 
2,4 379.32 8.75 
2,3 246.13 46.66 
1,4 305.85 5.77 
1,3 201.60 14.75 
1,2 236.67 4.85 
1,2,3 321.89 53.44 
1,2,4 456.58 14.02 
1,3,4 404.43 41.00 
2,3,4 472.58 49.30 
1,2,3,4 505.53 98.89 
 
Table 4.3 
Initial and final use for each player in pool market 
player i
f  
[MW] 
iϕ  
[MW] 
iii ff ϕ−='  
[MW] 
1 82.53 16.40 66.13 
2 158.99 24.98 134.01 
3 133.81 39.23 94.58 
4 229.09 18.28 210.81 
 
However, the same cannot be said if the game is played at each system branch. In Table 
4.4 coalitions with negative v(S) at some branches are shown. A negative function 
value for a coalition indicates that this coalition is not likely to form since the players 
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try to establish meaningful coalitions only. Thus, the fixed cost allocation game, as 
described above, it is not so likely to be played at each single system branch in a pool 
market. 
 
Table 4.4 
Coalitions with negative characteristic function values 
Coalition 
line 5-6 
v(S)  [MW] 
line 6-11 
v(S) [MW] 
line 6-12 
v(S) [MW] 
3,4 -0.34 4.96 0.05 
2,4 -0.29 -0.07 0.06 
1,2,4 -0.29 -0.06 0.16 
1,3,4 -0.34 6.62 0.14 
2,3,4 -0.80 7.96 0.09 
1,2,3,4 17.96 2.93 -0.43 
 
The same problem emerges even if a DC optimal power flow is used. The reason is the 
non-linear difference at the dispatch of the system’s generators in order to serve the 
single players and in order to serve the coalition that these players form. 
 
4.4.3 The game in the case of bilateral transactions 
 
  When the electricity market operates in an environment of dimerous trade then each 
transaction agent is responsible to pay a part of the power system fixed cost. Similarly 
to the case of pool market, the form of a coalition between some players can be 
profitable by the existence of counter flows. Note that the allocation of fixed cost is 
made for each time interval and not at a peak load moment. Hence, power flows in 
opposite direction are the motivation for the cooperation between players rather than the 
difference between players’ peak loads and coalition peak loads as in [87]. Using again 
the IEEE 14-bus network of Figure 2.6 consider the transactions of Table 4.5. The 
different sessions are incorporated just to investigate the game under various load 
patterns.  
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  In the beginning the embedded cost allocation of the entire system is investigated by 
means of an AC power flow program. In Table 4.6 the network usage, as well as the 
characteristic function value for each coalition, regarding the first time period, are 
presented.  
 
Table 4.5 
Transaction patterns 
Power [MW] 
Transaction 
From 
bus 
To
bus Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 
1 1 4 30 50 50 60 
2 2 13 30 50 55 65 
3 3 14 45 55 55 65 
4 6 9 50 60 80 70 
 
Table 4.6 
Use and characteristic function value for the 1st session 
coalition Sf  [MW] v(S) [MW] 
1 74.68 0 
2 135.43 0 
3 206.38 0 
4 169.71 0 
3,4 290.24 85.85 
2,4 200.80 104.34 
2,3 312.28 29.54 
1,4 233.73 10.65 
1,3 245.71 35.35 
1,2 185.48 24.63 
1,2,3 331.23 85.26 
1,2,4 261.55 118.27 
1,3,4 345.24 105.53 
2,3,4 372.08 139.44 
1,2,3,4 414.48 171.72 
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Similarly to the pool market case, the savings achieved by the grand coalition {1,2,3,4} 
should be shared by the four transaction agents. A Shapley value approach to this task is 
given in Table 4.7 together with the initial and final network usage for each agent. 
  An investigation of the game played at each single system branch may follow. Now, 
if  is the power flow over a system branch caused by agent i. In this case it is possible 
that some coalitions will have negative values at some branches. Actually, a cooperation 
between a set of transactions results in a superposition of the single transaction patterns. 
Thus, in the worst case at a branch for a coalition S it should be v(S)=0. This would 
happen if no counter flows exist. The explanation for the negative v(S) is that, since an 
AC power flow is used, a generator located at the reference bus must cover the losses. 
The dispatch of this generator leads to a deviation between the power flow caused by a 
coalition S and the perfect superposition of its members’ patterns. Thus, for some 
branches the sum of power flows caused by some players may be smaller than the 
power flow caused when these players form a coalition, i.e. ∑
=
> Sn
i
iS ff
1
. Consequently, 
negative characteristic function values will emerge. However, when the electricity 
market is organized according to a bilateral transaction model the fixed cost allocation 
game can be played at each single system branch. To cope with the problem of negative 
v(S) a DC power flow program should be used instead of an AC one. Thereby, the 
losses are neglected and the power flow of a coalition S over each system branch is the 
superposition of its members’ patterns. 
 
 
Table 4.7 
Initial and final use for the players concerning the 1st session 
player if  [MW] iϕ  [MW] iii ff ϕ−='  [MW] 
1 74.68 21.40 53.28 
2 135.43 47.35 88.08 
3 206.38 41.81 164.57 
4 169.71 61.16 108.55 
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4.4.4 Characteristics of the game 
 
  Up to this point the analysis has focused on the implementation of cooperative game 
theory in different types of electricity markets. It is interesting to extend the analysis by 
examining which of the cooperative game theory characteristics are applied in this case. 
 
4.4.4.1 Superadditivity 
 
   It is more likely to emerge coalitions when a game is superadditive. The mathematical 
expression of this feature has been presented in (4.6).  
  Consider the example of Figure 4.5. For each singe player coalition S it is v(S)=0. If 
any of the transactions T1 or T2 cooperates with transaction T3 then it is v(j,3)=200 
MW, j=1,2. If T1 and T3 cooperate with each other then it is v(1,2)=0. Thus, for any 
single player coalitions S and Θ, it is )()()( Θ+≥Θ∪ vSvSv . Hence, (4.6) is 
satisfied. This can be generalized for any coalition. If a coalition Θ joins a coalition S 
and Θ exhibits counter flow in comparison to the power flow of S then in (4.6) the 
inequality holds. Otherwise, (4.6) is satisfied through the equality.  
 
4.4.4.2 No convex game 
 
  A game is said to be convex by satisfying the following condition: 
 
{ } { } Θ⊆∈Θ∀−∪≥Θ−∪Θ SifNSiSviSvviv ,,),()()()(  (4.41) 
 
In other words, (4.41) states that assume coalition S is a subgroup of coalition Θ. Then 
the profit that any player i produces by joining coalition Θ should be larger or equal to 
the profit that i produces by joining coalition S. This condition may hold in case of 
power system fixed cost allocation game but not always. Consider the case which is 
presented in Table 4.6. For i={1}, S={3} and Θ ={3,4} one finds out from Table 4.6 
that { } )()( Θ−∪Θ viv =19.68 MW while {} )()( SviSv −∪ =35.43 MW. Hence, 
(4.41) is not satisfied and therefore the game is not convex. 
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4.4.4.3 Absence of dummy player 
 
  Dummy player, as described in (4.26), is the one who brings no benefit to any 
coalition which he joins. It is interesting to discuss if the fixed cost allocation game has 
dummy players. Assume that at over a line there exists at least one counter flow, as in 
Figure 4.5, so that the game is essential. For any single-player coalition it is v(i)=0. If 
any of T1, T2 cooperates with T3 then it is v(j,3)>0, j=1,2. Hence, all three transactions 
bring profit to at least one coalition. This conclusion is valid for any number of 
transactions. The only prerequisite is the existence of at least one counter flow. If there 
is no any counter flow over a particular line, then for any coalition S it will be v(S)=0. 
In this case, it is impossible for any player to bring profit and so the term of dummy 
player is not meaningful for this case. Consequently, in the power system fixed cost 
allocation game there is no dummy player.  
 
4.4.5 The nucleolus in fixed cost allocation game 
 
  At this point it is worthwhile to discuss the performance of some basic solution 
methods of cooperative game theory in the context of fixed cost allocation game.  
First, the nucleolus concept is considered. The advantage of the nucleolus solution is 
that it is part of the core. Thus, no other payoff vector can dominate the nucleolus over 
any coalition. When a payoff vector is not dominated then it is more likely for the 
players to accept it.  
  As already stated, a drawback of nucleolus concept is that it does not satisfy the 
demand for monotonicity. In electricity market, this fact means that the players may not 
always receive the right economic signal regarding the cost minimization. This would 
occur in case that an increase of v(S) of a coalition S, i.e. decrease of network usage, 
would not result in an increase of their payoff. Hence, this decrease of network use 
would not be connected with a reduction of the amount that the players have to pay for 
the use of the network. In this case, the players would not have the motivation to 
decrease the network usage.  
  Another disadvantage of nucleolus concept is that it favours some players. This can be  
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highlighted by studying the example presented in Figure 4.5. The solution resulted by 
nucleolus is presented in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 
Applying the nucleolus solution in electricity market 
f1 =100 MW n1 =0 MW f '1 = f1 - n1 =100 MW 
f2 =100 MW n2 =0 MW f '2 = f2 - n2 =100 MW 
f3 =100 MW n3 =200 MW f '3 = f1 - n1 =-100 MWÆ0 MW 
 
It is obvious that only the third transaction profits from this solution. Although there is 
no dummy player and all the three transactions contribute positive to at least one 
coalition the nucleolus concept is not beneficial for the two of them. Of course, this is 
an extreme paradigm. Generally, the differences, by the benefit share, are not so high. 
  The nucleolus concept remains an attractive solution despite these two drawbacks. The 
reason is that it gives allocation belonging to the core, when the core is not empty. The 
advantage of stable solutions is large enough so as to overcome the nucleolus’ 
idiosyncrasies.   
 
4.4.6 The Shapley value in fixed cost allocation game 
 
  In contrast to nucleolus, the Shapley value is monotone and so it can always send the 
right signal to market participants regarding the minimization of the costs paid for the 
network use. One of the axioms that characterize the Shapley value is that of additivity. 
Considering the embedded cost allocation game the additivity means that the payoff 
assigned to a player for the entire system game is equal to the sum of payoffs when the 
game is played at each system branch. Thus, using Shapley value, the network operator 
may analyse the allocation process at each branch attaining at the end the same result.  
  Defining the Shapley value the coalitional rationality of (4.12b) is not a requirement, 
so the Shapley value does not always belong to the core. Examining the case of Figure 
4.5 one finds out that 3.33)()( 21 == vv ϕϕ  MW and 4.133)(3 =vϕ  MW. So, 
200)3,1()()( 31 =<+ vvv ϕϕ  MW and consequently the allocation obtained by 
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Shapley value is not part of the core. However, depending on the network topology, the 
number of players and their transaction patterns, Shapley value may belong to the core 
as well.  
  For the transaction patterns presented in Table 4.5, the differences )(
1
Sv
Sn
i
i −∑
=
ϕ  are 
illustrated in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9 
Difference between characteristic function value and Shapley values sum 
                                      )(
1
Sv
Sn
i
i −∑
=
ϕ  [MW]  
Coalition 
 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 
1 21.40 32.71 33.96 40.33 
2 47.35 75.22 88.34 96.34 
3 41.81 53.57 59.90 63.48 
4 61.16 81.80 1.21 99.52 
3,4 17.12 32.04 41.79 42.19 
2,4 4.17 3.46 6.75 3.64 
2,3 59.62 82.78 98.50 101.21 
1,4 71.91 99.50 116.80 122.09 
1,3 27.86 37.50 45.09 45.74 
1,2 44.12 66.87 78.40 84.56 
1,2,3 25.30 32.62 46.71 39.48 
1,2,4 11.65 13.06 16.42 14.06 
1,3,4 18.84 35.10 44. 47.05 
2,3,4 10.88 17.97 17.93 22.53 
1,2,3,4 0 0 0 0 
 
The positive values for all but the grand coalition indicate that in this case the Shapley 
value allocation is coalitionally rational. Furthermore, the zeros at the last row show that 
the requirement of global rationality is satisfied. Consequently, the allocation vectors, 
given by the Shapley value for all the four time periods, belong to the core.  
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  Figure 4.6 gives an explanation for this conclusion. To each of the 15 coalitions 
correspond 20 columns. Each column shows the difference )(
1
Sv
Sn
i
i −∑
=
ϕ  for one of the 
20 system branches with respect to the fourth time session. As can be seen, many 
coalitions have negative differences for some branches. But the decisive point is that the 
sum of differences over all the lines is positive for any coalition. Hence, the coalitional 
rationality holds for the entire system game.  
 
Figure 4.6 Differences between the characteristic function value  
and the sum of Shapley values at each line 
 
  If the fixed cost allocation takes place using (4.37) then the players faces in any case a 
cost reduction so it is probable that they will not object to the use of the Shapley value. 
Assume (4.36) is used and consider the first time period. In the beginning there is no set 
of players which submit a common schedule. Furthermore, it is made the assumption 
that the Shapley value is not incorporated in the allocation scheme. The corresponding 
amount that each player has to pay can be found in Table 4.10 in the second column. C 
is set at zero in order to denote the absence of common schedule submission by any set 
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of players. S equal to zero indicates that the Shapley value is not used by the network 
operator. If now the Shapley value is used the players should pay the amount given in 
the third column. Player 3 has to pay more and therefore may have an objection to the 
adoption of such an allocation method. 
  In an open deregulated electricity market player 3 cannot prevent other players to 
cooperate. The possible coalitions that can form, without player 3, are the {1,2}, {1,4}, 
{2,4} and {1,2,4}. Table 4.10 shows the cost allocation if any of these coalitions takes 
place. For each case the cost allocation is made first without using the Shapley value 
and then by incorporating the Shapley value in the allocation scheme. The difference 
S
Si
i RRD −= ∑
∈
 denotes how much each coalition saves within the framework of the 
allocation scheme used at each time. 
 
Table 4.10  
On the acceptability of the Shapley value 
 
 R and D [% of K] 
Player C0
S 
0 
C 
0 
S 
1 
C 
1 
S 
0 
C 
1 
S 
1 
C 
1 
S 
0 
C 
1 
S 
1 
3 35.21 39.71 36.75 39.61 35.86 40.49 
1 12.74 12.85 40.61(1,4) 37.67(1,4) 
2 23.10 21.25 
33.03 
D=2.74
33.62 
D=0.48 23.53 21.84 
4 28.95 26.19 30.22 26.78 D=1.08 D=1.37 
 
 R and D [% of K] 
Player C 
1 
S 
0 
C 
1 
S 
1 
C 
1 
S 
0 
C 
1 
S 
1 
3 42.83 42.66 44.10 43.34 
1 15.00 13.44 
2 
4 
41.67 
D=10.38
43.90 
D=3.54
55.90 
 
D=8.89
56.66 
 
D=3.63
 
  Table 4.10 illustrates that in both cases, with and without the Shapley value, the 
coalitions {2,4} and {1,2,4} have the largest cost savings, as they are expressed by D. 
Thus, the probabilities these coalitions to form are higher than the probabilities for 
coalitions {1,2} and {1,4}. 
  As Table 4.10 indicates in the event of either {2,4} or {1,2,4} player 3 benefits from 
the use of the Shapley value. Hence, player 3 pays less in comparison to what this 
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player should pay if the Shapley value is not used and any of {2,4} or {1,2,4} will form. 
Thus, in this case the Shapley value protects player 3 against the most-probably-to-form 
coalitions. Hence, player 3 should not object to the use of the Shapley value. 
 
4.4.7 Comparison of different methods’ results 
 
  The network operator may have the intention to use some other solution methods 
rather than nucleolus and Shapley value. If political reasons demand the support of 
some weaker market participants then the Solidarity value will be a favourite candidate. 
In the event of a priori unions between some market participants, the network operator 
will rather use the Owen value than the Shapley value concept. Considering the first 
time session, results from the different solution methods have been calculated and they 
are presented in Table 4.11. The computation of Owen value is made under the 
assumption of an a priori union between the players 2 and 3. 
 
Table 4.11 
Results from different cooperative game theory concepts 
Player 
Shapley 
Value 
[MW] 
Solidarity 
Value 
[MW] 
Owen 
Value 
[MW] 
Nucleolus 
 
[MW] 
1 21.39 36.51 21.82 16.50 
2 47.35 44.22 53.26 49.67 
3 41.80 42.72 47.72 35.16 
4 61.16 48.26 48.91 70.67 
 
As can be seen, the Solidarity value results in a more 'flat' allocation of the savings 
between the market participants than the Shapley value. In contrast, by applying the 
nucleolus concept the player 4 is favoured. In case of nucleolus the spectrum of 
allocated payoffs, that is the difference between lowest and highest, is larger in 
comparison to any other solution method. However, the differences are not extreme. By 
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the implementation of Owen value the players 2 and 3, who have established the a priori 
union, profit.  
  In conclusion, it may be stated that the choice of the proper cooperative game theory 
concept depends on the particular aims, which have to be served by the network 
operator.  
 
4.5 Usage based methods and the core 
 
  The use of game theory may be extended in order to assess the performance of the 
existing usage based methods. Such methods are widely used by the independent system 
operators so as to charge the market participants regarding the power system fixed cost. 
This section seeks to assess the usage based allocations regarding the core of the game. 
As already stated an allocation that belongs to the core is more likely to be accepted by 
the market participants. Furthermore, a new method which finds core points from usage 
based methods is presented. 
 
4.5.1 The fixed cost allocation as cost game 
 
  In section 4.4, the fixed cost allocation game has been analysed as a savings game, 
indicated in (4.39). Generally, a cost allocation problem may be formed either as 
savings or as cost game. The latter means that the characteristic function value 
represents the costs caused by any coalition. In the case of fixed cost allocation game 
the characteristic function value of the cost game is given by: 
 
  ∑
=
= l
n
l
llS CPSc
1
,)(  (4.42) 
 
where )(Sc  are the costs allocated to the coalition S. The form of (4.42) is same to the 
payment iR  given by (4.37). The only difference is that the solution of cost game is the 
amount that each player has to pay while the solution of a savings game is the amount 
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that is abstracted from the stand-alone payment of a player. In any case, the final 
payment for each player is the same no matter which kind of game, savings or cost, is 
applied. For the rest of section 4.5 the cost game form will be used. 
 
4.5.2 A three players’ paradigm 
 
  In order to assess the performance of usage based allocations, regarding the core of the 
game, a paradigm with three transactions is considered. The marketplace is the AC 10-
bus test system illustrated in Figure 3.4. The first transaction injects 15 MW at node 1 
and withdraws them at node 2. The agent of the second transaction coordinates a 
purchase of 275 MW produced at node 3 and delivered at node 7. The third transaction 
involves the injection of 15 MW at node 10 and their take-over at node 4. This game, 
played as cost game, is geometrically illustrated in Figure 4.7. The core of the game 
embraces a limited space because of the large difference between the second transaction 
and the other two. This place is confined by all the lines corresponding to characteristic 
function value of one or two players’ coalitions.  
  Using the equations of section 4.3 the cost allocations obtained by usage based 
methods may be determined. In order to make this allocations comparable to the game 
the total amount K, for the equations of section 4.3, is set equal to the cost of grand 
coalition c(N). These allocations are then located in the imputation space of the fixed 
cost allocation game. As can be seen, only the allocation resulted by zero counter flow 
method is placed into the core. The counter flow method allocation is located outside 
the triangle because player one is charged with a negative amount. 
  Although that some of the usage based methods do not yield core allocations such 
allocations may be obtained by combining several usage based methods. In paradigm of 
the three transactions, a convex combination of postage stamp and MW-mile method 
results in points those are located along the dashed line. A part of this line is inside the 
core. 
  Consequently, it is possible to obtain allocations that will be part of the game core by 
weighting properly the usage based methods. A systematic method in order to achieve 
this aim will be given below. 
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Figure 4.7 Core of a three transactions game 
 
 
4.5.3 Core points from usage based allocations 
 
  The empirical remark made at the end of section 4.5.2 gives the impulse to define a 
formal approach which will give core points from usage based methods. Let Ω  be the 
set of usage based allocations and jiκ  the allocation to the i-th player by the j-th 
method. In order to find allocations that are as central to the core as possible, the 
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algorithm of (4.18) is used. This algorithm calculates the nucleolus of the game and so 
maximises the dissatisfaction of the most unhappy coalition. This will be also the 
criterion so as to find the optimal combination of the usage based methods. Each 
method j  is weighted by a factor jw  which varies between zero and unit. The cost iy  
allocated to any player i  will be a convex combination of the weighted allocations 
obtained by the different usage methods. These prerequisites are summarized as 
follows: 
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The conditions of (4.43) are incorporated in (4.18) and the linear program which 
calculates the optimal combination of the usage based methods is formulated as follows: 
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The problem of (4.44) is solved according to the process described in section 4.2.3. The 
resulting allocation vector y  is called restricted nucleolus (RN). This process of 
modifying the nucleolus algorithm is discussed in [90].  
  Regarding the three transactions paradigm of section 4.5.2 the set of the three methods 
that are outside the core is considered, i.e. { }CFMWMPS ,,=Ω . The new method 
presented in (4.44) results in the weights 427.0,573.0,0 === CFMWMPS www . 
Figure 4.8 illustrates the restricted nucleolus as well as the three usage based methods. 
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Figure 4.8 The restricted nucleolus placed in the core. 
 
 
  The above presented procedure places the restricted nucleolus into the core of the 
game if the topology of the usage based methods enables this placement. Otherwise, this 
method brings the restricted nucleolus as close as possible to the core. In order to obtain 
a unique solution through (4.44) the allocations obtained by the usage based methods 
must be linearly independent. Furthermore, the number of players must be at least equal 
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to the number of methods in order to have enough equations to determine a unique 
solution. 
  In case that the set of methods consists of the MW-mile, counter flow and zero counter 
flow methods the allocations are not linearly independent. Assuming, for simplicity, 
that 1== lCK , the usage measured by these three methods are: 
 
( )∑ −=
l
ll ,, ;max ii
MWM
i PPf , ∑=
l
l,i
CF
i Pf , ( )∑=
l
l 0;max ,i
ZCF
i Pf  (4.45) 
 
From (4.45) one easily finds out that ( )CFiMWMiZCFi fff += 21 . Thus, the cost 
allocated to a player i by the zero counter flow method can be written as: 
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Hence, (4.46) states that the set of these three methods is not linearly independent. 
Therefore, in the framework of the proposed method, it is not possible the synchronous 
use of these three methods. 
 
4.5.4 Numerical results 
 
  The method outlined in section 4.5.3 could be used as a mechanism to support the 
design of a fixed cost allocation system. One of the central issues by such a system is 
the choice of the proper usage based method. The new method provides the flexibility to 
the network operator of using a synthesis of usage based methods by adjusting the 
optimal weights.  
  In order to illustrate further this method and investigate its possible application mode a 
case with seven transactions is considered. Each transaction corresponds to an agent and 
so there are seven players in the game. The marketplace is the 14-bus test system shown 
in Figure 4.9. The networks’ data are given in Table C.2 of Appendix. The injection and 
delivery points of each transaction are presented in Table 4.12. 
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  From the usage based methods, described in section 4.3, the following triples can be 
formed: { } { }ZCFMWMPSCFMWMPS ,,,,,  and { }ZCFCFPS ,, . Neither the 
set { }ZCFCFMWMPS ,,,  nor the triple { }ZCFCFMWM ,,  can be incorporated 
in the method because of the linear dependency of MW-mile, counter flow and zero 
counter flow methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 The 14-bus test system 
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Table 4.12 
Transactions in the 14-bus test system 
Transaction Injection bus Delivery bus 
T1 1 14 
T2 3 2 
T3 4 5 
T4 7 6 
T5 10 13 
T6 11 8 
T7 12 9 
 
  It is essential to examine the performance of the suggested method by different load 
patterns. Therefore, eight different cases are taken into account. In all the cases, the 
power traded by each of the first five transactions is fixed to 100 MW. The power of the 
sixth transaction varies from 150 MW to 300 MW keeping the seventh transaction fixed 
to 100 MW. The sixth transaction is fixed when it reaches the 300 MW and then the 
seventh transaction increases the delivering power, in steps of 50 MW, up to 300 MW.  
  Defining the eight different load patterns the fixed cost allocated to each agent by each 
usage based method is estimated. 
 
Table 4.13 
Weights of usage based methods. PS-MWM-CF 
T1-T5 
[MW] 
T6 
[MW] 
T7 
[MW] 
PS MWM CF RN 
100 150 100 0.2829 0.0023 0.7148+ + 
100 200 100 0.2160 0.0500 0.7340+ + 
100 250 100 0.4673 0 0.5327+ + 
100 300 100 0.4316 0 0.5684+ + 
100 300 150 0.3818 0.1108 0.5074+ + 
100 300 200 0.3265 0.0967 0.5768+ + 
100 300 250 0.3996 0.0743 0.5261+ + 
100 300 300 0.4138 0.1727 0.4135+ + 
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Table 4.14 
Weights of usage based methods. PS-MWM-ZCF 
T1-T5 
[MW] 
T6 
[MW] 
T7 
[MW] 
PS MWM ZCF RN 
100 150 100 0.0299 0 0.9701  
100 200 100 0 0 1.0000  
100 250 100 0 0 1.0000  
100 300 100 0 0 1.0000  
100 300 150 0 0 1.0000  
100 300 200 0 0 1.0000  
100 300 250 0 0 1.0000  
100 300 300 0.0524 0 0.9476  
 
Table 4.15 
Weights of usage based methods. PS-ZCF-CF 
T1-T5 
[MW] 
T6 
[MW] 
T7 
[MW] 
PS ZCF CF RN 
100 150 100 0.2829 0.0032 0.7138+ + 
100 200 100 0.2160 0.0720 0.7120+ + 
100 250 100 0.4673 0 0.5327+ + 
100 300 100 0.4316 0 0.5684+ + 
100 300 150 0.3818 0.1629 0.4553+ + 
100 300 200 0.3265 0.1422 0.5313+ + 
100 300 250 0.3996 0.1097 0.4907+ + 
100 300 300 0.4138 0.2571 0.3292+ + 
 
Then, for all the load patterns, the suggested method is applied using the three triples 
mentioned above. The total amount K  is always equal to the corresponding cost of the 
grand coalition )(Nc . Tables 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 show the weights of the usage based 
methods by applying the suggested method. The symbol + denotes that the 
corresponding allocation is part of the core. As can be seen, the weights are not stable. 
Their spectrum becomes quite wide by changing the load patterns. This remark is 
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applied to any triple with the exception of PS-MWM-ZCF where the zero counter flow 
method seems to have a dominating role. The weights’ variation has also been noticed 
in other networks that have been investigated in the framework of this research work. 
However, from the Tables 4.13 and 4.15 it can be seen that for relative small changes in 
load patterns the weights may not drastically vary. 
  For an independent system operator it is of great significance to define a stable 
charging framework. For that reason, the weights should remain unchanged as much as 
possible. A solution to this problem is the allocation of fixed cost according to average 
weights. The ISO may calculate the weights corresponding to the usage based methods 
for any set of methods for an extended spectrum of load patterns. Then, the ISO can 
determine the average weight of each method. Using these average weights the ISO 
could charge the market participants for any load pattern. A regular updating of those 
weights, but not too often, taking into account the most current load patterns, would be 
necessary. This idea is implied in case of the three triples shown above. The average 
weights have been calculated and then the players have been charged for each case 
using those weights. 
  An essential criterion for the performance of any allocation vector y is the excess e  of 
the most dissatisfactory coalition. In case of cost game this excess is given as 
∑
∈
−=
Si
iySce )( . Hence, the higher the excess the more satisfactory is the coalition.  
This excess is presented in Table 4.16. For any load pattern the excess is calculated 
using the usage based methods, the suggested method based on the three triples as well 
as the average weights (Av) obtained for each of these three triples. A positive value 
indicates that the corresponding allocation is part of the core since the coalitional 
rationality holds even for the most dissatisfactory coalition. The indices 1, 2 and 3 refer 
to the triples PS-MWM-CF, PS-MWM-ZCF and PS-CF-ZCF respectively. The values 
in Table 4.16 are given as percentages of the grand coalition cost )(Nc  in order to be 
comparable. As can be seen, the triple of postage stamp, MW-mile and counter flow 
methods exhibits the highest excesses. This remark holds for both the restricted 
nucleolus and the average weights. In the most cases these excesses are equal to the 
ones of the triple of postage stamp, counter flow and zero counter flow. But in any case, 
the excesses of the first triple are at least as high as the excesses of the third triple.  
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Table 4.16 
Performance of the smallest excess in the cost game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The explanation of this phenomenon may be found from the remark made in section 
4.5.3. Since ZCF is a convex combination of MWM and CF, any triple where ZCF 
substitutes one of MWM and CF cannot lead to a better placement of the combined 
allocation in comparison to the allocation obtained by the original triple. Thus, from all 
the triples investigated in the present work the most efficient is the set of postage stamp, 
MW-mile and counter flow methods.  
                    mine [in % of )(Nc ] T1-T5 
[MW] 
T6 
[MW] 
T7 
[MW] Av1 RN1 Av2 RN2 Av3 RN3 
100 150 100 2.04 3.20 -1.78 -1.59 2.01 3.20 
100 200 100 0.49 2.93 -3.35 -3.30 0.47 2.93 
100 250 100 2.89 3.25 -2.00 -1.92 2.89 3.25 
100 300 100 2.20 2.40 -3.62 -3.53 2.20 2.40 
100 300 150 1.86 2.17 -2.99 -2.91 1.86 2.17 
100 300 200 1.57 1.88 -1.90 -1.82 1.57 1.88 
100 300 250 0.96 1.02 -2.55 -2.51 0.96 1.02 
100 300 300 0.67 1.15 -0.96 -0.79 0.67 1.15 
mine [in % of )(Nc ] T1-T5 
[MW] 
T6 
[MW] 
T7 
[MW] PS MWM CF ZCF 
100 150 100 -5.66 -5.42 0.20 -1.88 
100 200 100 -8.15 -7.79 1.52 -3.30 
100 250 100 -9.94 -9.53 0.32 -1.92 
100 300 100 -11.98 -11.54 0.54 -3.53 
100 300 150 -11.06 -11.36 0.09 -2.91 
100 300 200 -8.80 -9.68 0.07 -1.82 
100 300 250 -6.09 -7.78 0.21 -2.51 
100 300 300 -7.00 -5.39 0.31 -1.00 
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  A very important remark, made by observing Table 4.16, is that the allocations 
obtained from the average weights of the first and third triple are always part of the 
core. Hence, the network operator could adopt those average weights in order to provide 
a stable allocation scheme which yields core points. 
 
4.6 Sensitivity based stand-alone usage 
 
  The last, chronologically, part of this research work has dealed with the issue of the 
stand-alone usage. In the short history of applying cooperative game theory in fixed cost 
allocation problem, the stand-alone usage has always been calculated considering each 
player alone in the network. The same philosophy has been followed in this research 
work. However, the increasing experience, obtained during the research, revealed some 
problems that appear because of this definition of stand-alone usage. 
  An alternative method, based on sensitivity calculations, which copes with these 
problems, has been developed. Despite the short time of working on this method, it 
should be useful to outline its principle and illustrate through a paradigm the 
performance of this method. The presentation of this method may be considered as an 
impulse for future work on this topic. It should be emphasized that the adoption of this 
method does not change at all the analysis described in the whole chapter 4. The only 
difference is that other values would be used as stand-alone usages.  
 
4.6.1 The problem 
 
  When for selected players or coalitions the stand-alone network usage is calculated, 
taking into consideration by the load flow or OPF program only these players, several 
problems may arise.  
  First of all, if an AC program is used, indifferent if it is OPF or just a simple load flow 
program, it may be impossible to find a solution in large networks. This can happen in 
real interconnected networks where the AC will not converge if the player’s load is just 
a small part of the total network capacity.  
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  Furthermore, the generators’ dispatch is much different at the operating point in 
comparison to the dispatch in order to serve the single players. This difference is large 
in case of pool market. For a bilateral market, using AC programs, this different is only 
due to dispatch of reference generator in order to cover the power losses. 
  In the case of DC load flow the convergence problem does not exist since DC load 
flow is a set of linear equations having always a solution. However, this algorithm 
provides only an approximation of the real network situation. Additionally, in case of 
pool market even using a DC-OPF program negative characteristic function values may 
arise when the game is played at each single system branch.  
  The above remarks point out that there is a demand of improving the way that the 
stand-alone costs are calculated. 
 
4.6.2 Methodology 
 
  In the context of the research work, a new method has been developed in order to cope 
with the above problems. The method is numerical and it is based on the power flow 
sensitivities.  
  The philosophy of the new method is that the stand-alone usage should be determined 
considering the electricity market operating point. In this way the above outlined 
problems would not appear. The question is how could be estimated the separate usage 
of each player or coalition according to this philosophy. The power flow sensitivity 
seems to be a solution to this task. The use of sensitivities is a well-known tool among 
the engineers. In the investigated problem these sensitivities show the change in active 
power flow over a particular line with respect to change by the active and reactive load 
of each player. Thus, these sensitivities can be used as the basis for a new determination 
of the stand-alone usage. 
  The modern technology of computers, as well as the software development, enables 
the calculation of OPF or power flow in a very short time. Thus, there is no need for 
analytical estimation of the power flow sensitivities. Such sensitivities may be 
calculated by increasing a load in a marginal way and observing the change in power 
flow over a particular line. 
  Assume that there are n  players participating in a marketplace. The symbol iτ  
denotes the active and the reactive power of player i . 
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  The symbol LineP  denotes the active power flow over a particular line. In order to 
calculate the searched sensitivities, the power corresponding to each player is 
marginally increased and a new OPF or power flow is run. For each player this 
procedure consists of two phases. In the first phase the active power is increased while 
the reactive power remains unchanged. In the second phase the active power returns to 
its initial value and the reactive power is marginally increased. Hence, for the n  players 
the number of the necessary calculations is n2 . The reactive power is taken into 
consideration because it affects the active power losses. The active power flow 
sensitivity, regarding the power change of player i , is: 
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where 
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: Change in power flow over a particular line caused by a marginal change in 
reactive power of player i  
 
  If all the loads, active and reactive, were simultaneously changed, the difference in 
power flow over a particular line would be: 
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where 
 
LineP∆ : change in active power flow over a particular line 
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iτ∆ :  change in power of player i  
 
  The vector of sensitivities, shown in (4.47), may be denoted as a factor iη . If the 
power flow would represent a linear problem, then Equation (4.48) could be 
generalized. That is, the total active power flow over a particular line would be given as 
follows: 
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  However, if AC is used, neither power flow nor optimal power flow is linear. In 
particular, the optimal power flow problem exhibits a strong non-linear character. Thus, 
it is always LineLine PP ≠' . In order to overcome this mismatch a diorthosis of the factor 
iη  is necessary. The right factors 
*
iη should result in power flow equal to the real one. 
Thus, the diorthosis is made through the following equation: 
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  Using the new factors one may retrieve the real active power flow over a line: 
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From (4.51), it is obvious that the stand-alone usage of player i , considering a 
particular line, may be defined as: 
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For any coalition S its stand-alone usage is the absolute value of the sum of its 
members’ power flows, weighted by the specific transfer cost: 
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  The new method is consistent with the philosophy of stand-alone usage since it 
calculates how each participant uses the network facilities. Moreover, it takes into 
consideration the idiosyncrasies of the electric networks.  
  In comparison to the existing definition of the stand-alone usage, the new method has 
the following advantages: 
• The new method considers the operating point. Thus, the calculated usages refer 
to the real network situation. 
• There is no convergence problem in any case. Full AC programs can be used in 
order to calculate the usages. Thereby, the exact situation is taken into 
consideration and not an approximation, as with the DC programs. 
• The new method has a great benefit considering the calculation time. The n2  
calculations, needed for the sensitivities’ estimation, can be carried out in a short 
time. After this estimation the proposed method needs n2  calculations in order 
to determine the usage for each coalition. This is the same number with the 
calculations needed by the existing method. However, there is a significant 
difference. The proposed method will execute n2  algebraic calculations, as 
(4.53) indicates. The existing stand-alone definition requires n2  power flow or 
OPF calculations. In case of OPF the best programs, running on the faster 
computers, needs about 0.1 second to calculate one case. So, assuming 20 
players the required time is about 100000 seconds or more than a day. The same 
number of algebraic calculations can be executed within 1-2 minutes. Hence, the 
proposed method copes with the most serious, for the time being, problem of 
applying game theory in fixed cost allocation. This is the problem of time. Of 
course, the new method is also limited. But in a wholesale market consisting of 
20-30 players it is possible to implement this method.  
• The sum of stand-alone usages calculated by the suggested method matches 
exactly the real power flow over any line. 
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• Using the sensitivity based method the motivation of forming a coalition is only 
due to the possible counter flows, as (4.53) indicates. In the existing method the 
players may have the intention to form a coalition even in absence of counter 
flow. This could be possible if the different generators’ dispatch, considering the 
coalition and the single players, results in lower line usage. But the motivation to 
the game should be based rather on realistic facts, such as the counter flows, 
than on fictitious situations such as the use of the whole network from one 
player. 
One the other hand, the suggested method has a single drawback. The deviation 
between 'LineP  and LineP  can be very large. Of course, the factor diorthosis eliminates 
this deviation. 
 
4.6.3 Numerical results 
 
  The sensitivity based method has been tested in the IEEE 30-bus network, Figure 4.10, 
in order to illustrate its performance. The network’s data are given in Table C.3, in 
Appendix C.  
The marketplace is a mandatory pool, as the one described in section 4.4.2, and consists 
of six suppliers and ten consumers. The consumers have inelastic demand and they are 
considered as the fixed cost allocation game player.  
  In order to highlight the different performance of the suggested method, its result will 
be compared to the usage obtained by the existing method. Furthermore, results from a 
version of the existing method will be presented.  
  The existing method consists of calculating the stand-alone usage as if the player, or 
coalition, were alone in the network. Thus, in the investigated case an OPF calculation 
will be executed for each single player. The results of this calculation will be the stand-
alone usage.  
  Another way of calculating the stand-alone usage Sf of a coalition S  is, if the usage is 
given as the difference SNN ff −−  between the grand coalition usage and the usage of 
the coalition of the SN −  players. In this case, the incremental change in line power 
flow is considered as the stand-alone usage.  
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Figure 4.10 The IEEE 30-bus system 
 
  In the framework of this work, the existing method is called upstream method because 
it begins from single players and goes up to the grand coalition. The modified version of 
the existing method is likewise called downstream method.  
  Considering each of these three methods, the stand-alone usage of the single players 
has been calculated. At all the network lines the specific transfer cost lC  is set at 1 
€/MW. Thus, power flow and the line usage will be identical, regarding the absolute 
value. The number of players, ten, results in 1024 possible coalitions. For that reason, 
only the single-players usage is presented.  
10
15 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 11 
28 
12 
13 
14 
16
17 
18
19
20
21 22
23 24 25
26
27
29 
30
~ ~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
 4.6  Sensitivity based stand-alone usage 138
Table 4.17 
Stand-alone power flow from different methods. IEEE 30-bus, line 1-3 
Upstream method Downstream method Sensitivity method  
 
Player 
 
iLineP ,  
 
[MW] 
NLine
iLine
P
P
,
,  
[%] 
iLineP ,  
 
[MW] 
NLine
iLine
P
P
,
,  
[%] 
iLineP ,  
 
[MW] 
NLine
iLine
P
P
,
,  
[%] 
1 (bus 4) 3.23 11.49 2.51 8.93 3.70 13.16 
2 (bus 8) 2.19 7.79 1.45 5.16 2.13 7.58 
3 (bus 10) 2.42 8.61 1.82 6.47 2.68 9.53 
4 (bus 12) 2.86 10.17 2.17 7.72 3.14 11.17 
5 (bus 14) 2.93 10.42 2.14 7.61 3.26 11.60 
6 (bus 15) 2.79 9.93 2.02 7.19 2.99 10.64 
7 (bus 20) 2.60 9.25 1.93 6.87 2.91 10.35 
8 (bus 21) 2.43 8.64 1.80 6.40 2.66 9.46 
9 (bus 24) 2.55 9.07 1.31 4.66 2.56 9.11 
10 (bus 29) 2.59 9.21 1.07 3.81 2.08 7.40 
Sum 1-10 26.59 94.58 18.22 64.82 28.11 100.00 
 
Table 4.18 
Stand-alone power flow from different methods. IEEE 30-bus, line 6-28 
Upstream method Downstream method Sensitivity method  
 
Player 
 
iLineP ,  
 
[MW] 
NLine
iLine
P
P
,
,  
[%] 
iLineP ,  
 
[MW] 
NLine
iLine
P
P
,
,  
[%] 
iLineP ,  
 
[MW] 
NLine
iLine
P
P
,
,  
[%] 
1 (bus 4) -0.82 -106.49 -4.22 -548.05 0.19 24.68 
2 (bus 8) 1.66 215.58 -1.93 -250.65 0.09 11.69 
3 (bus 10) 0.67 87.01 -2.61 -338.96 0.12 15.58 
4 (bus 12) 0.25 32.47 -2.98 -387.01 0.13 15.58 
5 (bus 14) 0.45 58.44 -2.79 -362.34 0.13 16.88 
6 (bus 15) 0.68 88.31 -2.57 -333.77 0.12 15.58 
7 (bus 20) 0.63 81.82 -2.67 -346.75 0.12 15.58 
8 (bus 21) 0.92 119.48 -2.27 -294.81 0.10 14.29 
9 (bus 24) 2.73 354.55 -0.88 -114.29 0.03 3.91 
10 (bus 29) 10.64 1381.82 3.78 490.91 -0.26 -33.77 
Sum 1-10 17.81 2312.99 -19.84 -2485.71 0.77 100.00 
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  Nevertheless, these usages provide enough information in order to assess the 
performance of the three methods. In Tables 4.17 and 4.18 the stand-alone power flows 
regarding two of the system lines are presented. 
  As can be seen, the suggested method is the only one which matches the real active 
power flow. In the case of line 1-3, the two other methods underestimate the power 
flow. A very impressive result is shown in Table 4.18. The existing method, as well as 
its modified version, yields deviation of more than 2300% from the real power flow. Of 
course, these large differences are an extra motivation, except of counter flows, for the 
players to cooperate but as it already stated it should be better if the motivation were 
based only on more realistic arguments, such as the counter flows. This paradigm 
highlights also the difference between generators’ dispatch considering the grand 
coalition and the dispatch regarding the single players. Another remark, made by 
observing both Table 4.17 and Table 4.18, is the large difference between the upstream 
and the downstream method. Both of them are consistent with the narrow definition of 
the stand-alone usage. However, the large differences indicate that it is very important if 
the OPF calculation is carried out starting from each single player or by computing the 
incremental changes.  
  In conclusion, it may be stated that the proposed method overcomes some significant 
problems arising from the existing definition of stand-alone usage. Further work 
towards a more proper definition of stand-alone usage may result in an improved 
incorporation of cooperative game theory in fixed cost allocation problem. 
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Chapter 5 
Epilogue 
 
 
 
5.1 Synopsis 
 
  The electricity industry has undergone a dramatical change in many countries during 
the last years. The demand for higher economic efficiency as well as the political trends 
of market opening have been resulting in deregulation of the power sectors. The 
existing high voltage networks and the increasing efficiency of generation technology 
have facilitated this restructuring. The next phase of the deregulation process is the 
emerging of inter-regional markets, such as the Internal Market of Electricity in 
European Union, and the coordination of the existing liberalised markets, which can be 
faced in the FERC’s directive requiring a Standard Market Design in USA. 
  This PhD thesis deals with the issue of congestion management in markets operating 
under the pool model. The congestion component of nodal prices has been analysed. 
Moreover, a method for the allocation of this component to the market participants has 
been suggested. The usefulness of this method is highlighted by the different share of 
suppliers in generation and congestion component. This difference points out that the 
ISO should not take into consideration only the suppliers’ output by applying the 
congestion management. Additionally, in the context of this work, the issue of both 
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suppliers’ and consumers’ behaviour, regarding the bid prices, in a pool market has 
been addressed. Bid price reductions have been found to lead to an increased impact, 
from the side of the corresponding participant, on power flows over the lines with 
changed congestion situation. The ISO may take advance of this finding by the set up of 
an efficient congestion management framework.  
  Furthermore, the implementation of the pool model in a real market, such as the Nord 
Pool, has been investigated. Particularly, the incorporation of loss factors and zonal 
pricing has been compared to the performance of a nodal pricing mechanism. In order to 
facilitate this comparison, a theoretical model, which enables the calculations of zonal 
prices using nodal pricing algorithm, has been developed. The conclusion obtained by 
this comparison is that the more administrative rules are implied the higher the 
deviation from the nodal prices will be.  
  Beyond the costs caused by system congestions, the research work has focused on the 
allocation of the power system fixed cost to the market participants. For this purpose, 
the incorporation of cooperative game theory has been analysed. The methods of this 
theory seems to provide stable and economic efficient allocations. A conclusion drawn 
by examining different types of electricity market is that the fixed cost allocation should 
take place rather in the whole network than in single branch level. A further part of this 
research was the development of a new method based on the existing usage based 
allocation methods. The new method, using the nucleolus philosophy, provides 
allocations that are more likely to be accepted by the market participants. Additionally, 
a new approach to the calculation of the stand-alone usage has been presented. This 
approach overcomes problems arising by the traditional definition of stand-alone usage. 
 
5.2 Future research work 
 
  The deregulation of the electricity market brings numerous challenges. The integration 
of local markets, operating under different modes, in an inter-regional market requires 
further investigation. The coordination of several congestion management mechanisms, 
as well as different fixed cost tariffs, is a field where the present work can be continued.  
  A further research topic is made up by the ancillary services that are necessary for the 
harmonious performance of the network. Among them the consideration of reactive 
power in congestion situations forms a special challenge.  
  A central aim of this work was to combine the technical side of the power systems 
with the economic nature of a market. In this context, the development of methods that 
will deal with the hedging of risk is a field, which calls for more research. The risk in a 
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deregulated market arises, mainly, through price volatility but also because of 
uncertainties regarding regulatory and technical issues. Therefore, all of these different 
kind of risks should be further investigated.  
  Finally, the use of game theory in the deregulated electricity market is a field where 
the future research will focus on. The investigation of marketplaces with a large number 
of players should be realised. An engineer, working on the electricity market, could take 
advance of game theoretical methods in order to cope with this problem. However, the 
idiosyncrasies of the electric networks should be taken into account. The definition of 
stand-alone usage is only one topic where improvements have to be done. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table A.1 
Data of the IEEE 14-bus system 
From 
bus 
To 
bus 
r [p.u.] x [p.u.] b [p.u.] 
Transfer 
capacity 
[MVA] 
1 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.05280 200 
1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.04920 100 
2 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.04380 100 
2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0 100 
2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.03400 100 
3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.03460 100 
4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.01280 100 
4 7 0 0.20450 0 100 
4 9 0 0.53890 0 100 
5 6 0 0.23490 0 100 
6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0 100 
6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0 100 
6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0 100 
7 8 0 0.17615 0 100 
7 9 0 0.11001 0 100 
9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0 100 
9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0 100 
10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0 100 
12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0 100 
13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0 100 
 
Shunt susceptance at bus 9: 19 MVAR injected at ..1 upV =  
kV138
MVA100
=
=
b
b
V
S
 
The data of the IEEE 14-bus system are taken from the files included in [65]. 
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Table A.2 
Bid offers of market participants in the case of IEEE 14-bus system in Chapter 2 
Bus Art 
Power 
[MW] 
Price 
[ct/kWh]
Power 
[MW] 
Price 
[ct/kWh] 
1 Supplier 70 2.24 200 3.0 
2 Supplier 70 2.25 200 3.1 
3 Supplier 70 2.26 200 3.2 
6 Supplier 70 2.27 200 3.3 
4 Consumer 140 4.2 - - 
9 Consumer 140 4.3 - - 
13 Consumer 140 4.4 - - 
14 Consumer 140 4.5 - - 
 
 
  
Appendix B 
 
Table B.1 
Data of the 10-bus test system 
From 
bus 
To 
bus 
r [p.u.] x [p.u.] b [p.u.] 
Transfer 
capacity 
[MVA] 
Specific 
transfer 
cost lC  
[€/MW] 
1 2 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
1 4 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
2 3 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
2 5 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
3 6 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
4 5 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
4 7 0.0028 0.0288 1.0156 800 3.2 
5 6 0.0028 0.0288 1.0156 800 3.2 
5 7 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
5 8 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 800 2.0 
6 10 0.0024 0.0252 0.8888 800 2.8 
6 8 0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 4.0 
7 8 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 800 2.0 
8 9 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 800 2.0 
8 10 0.0028 0.0288 1.0156 800 3.2 
9 10 0.0024 0.0252 0.8888 800 2.8 
 
kV380V
MVA100
b =
=bS  
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Table B.2 
Bid offers of market participants in the case of 10-bus test system 
Bus Art max
P  
[MW] 
maxp  
[ct/kWh]
1 Supplier 150 3 
2 Supplier 150 6 
4 Supplier 150 6 
7 Supplier 250 9 
5 Consumer 100 20 
6 Consumer 100 20 
9 Consumer 100 20 
10 Consumer 100 20 
 
  
Appendix C 
 
Table C.1 
Generation data for the IEEE 14-bus system in Chapter 4 
 Cost data 
Bus a b c 
maxP  
[MW] 
1 0.01 10 100 70 
2 0.01 10 100 70 
3 0.02 20 100 80 
6 0.02 15 100 90 
 
 
Table C.2 
Data of the 14-bus test system ( kV380,MVA100 == bb VS ) 
From 
bus 
To 
bus r [p.u.] x [p.u.] b [p.u.] 
Transfer 
capacity 
[MVA] 
Specific 
transfer 
cost lC  
[€/MW] 
1 2 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
2 3 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
3 4 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
1 4 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
1 10 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
10 9 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
9 8 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
8 7 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
7 6 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
6 5 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
5 4 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
1 6 0.0043 0.0450 1.5870 1250 10.0 
9 7 0.0043 0.0450 1.5870 1250 10.0 
7 11 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
11 12 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
12 13 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
13 14 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
14 4 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 1250 4.0 
6 14 0.0043 0.0450 1.5870 1250 10.0 
7 13 0.0043 0.0450 1.5870 1250 10.0 
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Table C.3 
Data of the IEEE 30-bus system 
From 
bus 
To 
bus r [p.u.] x [p.u.] b [p.u.] 
Transfer 
capacity 
[MVA] 
1 2 0.02 0.06 0.03 130 
1 3 0.05 0.19 0.02 130 
2 4 0.06 0.17 0.02 65 
3 4 0.01 0.04 0 130 
2 5 0.05 0.20 0.02 130 
2 6 0.06 0.18 0.02 65 
4 6 0.01 0.04 0 90 
5 7 0.05 0.12 0.01 70 
6 7 0.03 0.08 0.01 130 
6 8 0.01 0.04 0 32 
6 9 0 0.21 0 65 
6 10 0 0.56 0 32 
9 11 0 0.21 0 65 
9 10 0 0.11 0 65 
4 12 0 0.26 0 65 
12 13 0 0.14 0 65 
12 14 0.12 0.26 0 32 
12 15 0.07 0.13 0 32 
12 16 0.09 0.20 0 32 
14 15 0.22 0.20 0 16 
16 17 0.08 0.19 0 16 
15 18 0.11 0.22 0 16 
18 19 0.06 0.13 0 16 
19 20 0.03 0.07 0 32 
10 20 0.09 0.21 0 32 
10 17 0.03 0.08 0 32 
10 21 0.03 0.07 0 32 
10 22 0.07 0.15 0 32 
21 22 0.01 0.02 0 32 
15 23 0.10 0.20 0 16 
22 24 0.12 0.18 0 16 
23 24 0.13 0.27 0 16 
24 25 0.19 0.33 0 16 
25 26 0.25 0.38 0 16 
25 27 0.11 0.21 0 16 
28 27 0 0.40 0 65 
27 29 0.22 0.42 0 16 
27 30 0.32 0.60 0 16 
29 30 0.24 0.45 0 16 
8 28 0.06 0.20 0.02 32 
6 28 0.02 0.06 0.01 32 
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Shunt susceptance at bus 5: 0.19 MVAR injected at ..1 upV =  
Shunt susceptance at bus 24: 0.04 MVAR injected at ..1 upV =  
kV135
MVA100
=
=
b
b
V
S
 
The data of the IEEE 30-bus system are taken from the files included in [65]. 
 
 
 
Table C.4 
Generation data for the IEEE 30-bus system  
 Cost data 
Bus a b c 
maxP  
[MW] 
1 0.0200 2.00 0 80 
2 0.0175 1.75 0 80 
22 0.0625 1.00 0 50 
27 0.0083 3.25 0 55 
23 0.0250 3.00 0 30 
13 0.0250 3.00 0 40 
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Acronyms and Symbols 
 
 
Acronyms: 
 
ATC Available Transfer Capability 
CF Counter Flow Method 
ECNZ Electricity Corporation New Zealand 
FACTS Flexible AC Transmission System 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
GGDF Generalized Generation Distribution Factor 
GSDF Generation Shift Distribution Factor 
IEM Internal Market of Electricity  
ISO Independent System Operator 
LMP Locational Marginal Pricing 
LP Linear Programming 
MW Megawatt 
MWM MW-Mile Method 
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangements  
NGDF Nodal Generation Distribution Factor 
NLDF Nodal Load Distribution Factor 
OPF Optimal Power Flow 
PS Post Stamp Method 
SMD Standard Market Design 
TGDF Topological Generation Distribution Factor 
TPA Third Party Access 
ZCF Zero Counter Flow Method 
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Latin symbols: 
 
A  Matrix used in the compact form of congestion component equation 
)(SAv  Average marginal contribution to coalition S 
a, b, c Factors of polynomial cost function 
a, b, c, d Vectors of variable factors of dual problem objective function  
Β  Union of all the a priori unions belonging to the permutation π 
C Common schedule submission 
lC  Specific transfer cost of branch l 
iCF  Amount charged to participant i according to the Counter Flow method 
iCP  Compensation payment by FTRs to participant i 
CR(v) The core of a game 
)(Sc  Characteristic function value of coalition S in the case of 
cost game 
e Excess value 
f Set of equality constraints in OPF 
if  Usage of network by the market participant i 
lif ,  Usage of branch l  by the market participant i 
rf  
Set of equality constraints concerning the reference bus 
at OPF 
g Set of inequality constraints at OPF 
h Set of inequality constraints at OPF 
h1 Set of strategies of player H1 
J Set of a priori unions 
K Social welfare 
l Power system branch 
kAL ,  NGDF of generator at bus k for the bus A 
M  Matrix equal to diag(µ) 
M Symbol denoting either active or reactive power 
iMWM  Amount charged to participant i according to the MW-Mile method 
n  Number of players 
ln  Number of power system lines 
bn  Number of power system buses 
Acronyms and Symbols 165
N Set of players 
N(v) The nucleolus of a game 
Gn  Number of system generators 
Sn  Number of players in coalition S 
p  Price for electricity 
kAP ,  Impact of generator at bus k to the power inflows of bus A 
kAOjP ,  Share of generator at bus k in the power flow over the line AOj 
GP  Real power generation 
GP  Vector of real power generation 
maxGP  Vector of maximal active generation 
minGP  Vector of minimal active generation 
GrP  Active power generation at reference bus 
iP  Power associated with participant i 
AOjIiAP ,  Share of line IiA in power flow over the line AOj 
LP  Real power demand 
LP  Vector of real power demand 
LineP  Active power flow over a particular line 
maxP  Maximal generation or demand 
maxp  Maximal accepted price 
maxp  Vector of maximal accepted prices 
minp  Minimal accepted price 
minp  Vector of minimal accepted prices 
iPS  Amount charged to participant i according to the Postage Stamp method 
ULP  Uncovered portion of load 
ULP  Vector of uncovered portion of load 
GQ  Vector of reactive generation 
maxGQ  Vector of maximal reactive generation 
minGQ  Vector of minimal reactive generation 
GrQ  Reactive power generation at reference bus 
LQ  Vector of reactive load 
r  Reference bus 
  Acronyms and Symbols 166 
R Payment to the ISO 
S Use of Shapley value 
S Vector of apparent power flow 
S, Θ, Ε, Ζ Coalitions 
maxS  Vector of maximal apparent power flow 
st Strategy in a game 
iST  Set of strategies of i-th player 
jT  The j-th a priori union 
u Payoff 
V  Vector of voltage magnitude 
v Characteristic function 
v(i) Characteristic function value of player i 
v(N) Characteristic function value of the grand coalition 
rV  Bus voltage magnitude at reference bus 
x  Vector including the variables of OPF 
0x  Linearisation point 
);( Jvyi  Owen value 
y, k, ε, ζ Imputations 
z Zonal pricing restriction 
iZCF  Amount charged to participant i according to the Zero Counter Flow method 
 
 
Hellenic symbols: 
ijα  Element at the i-th row and j-th column of matrix A 
Γ Set of a priori unions’ numbers 
iγ  Line in core figure 
η  Factor based on power flow sensitivity 
Η1,Η2 Players 
θ Vector of voltage angle 
)(yθ  The n2  values v(S)- y(S) 
rθ  Bus voltage angle at reference bus 
j
iκ  Cost allocated to i-th player by the j-th method 
λ Vector of nodal price /Lagrange multipliers of bus power balance 
Λ  Matrix giving the allocation of congestion component to the single congestions. 
Cλ  Vector of nodal price component due to congestions 
Acronyms and Symbols 167
CPiλ  Congestion component of nodal price for active power at bus i  
CQiλ  Congestion component of nodal price for reactive power at bus i  
expectedλ  Common marginal cost in case of zonal pricing by means of nodal pricing mechanism 
Gλ  Nodal price component due to generation 
GLλ  Vector of nodal price component due to generation and losses 
iλ  Nodal price at bus i  
ai,λ  Element at the i-th row and a-th column of matrix Λ 
jLCPi,λ  Part of nodal price congestion component of active power at bus i due to power flow congestion at line j 
Losλ  Nodal price component due to losses 
minPVΛ  
maxPVΛ  
PLΛ , QLΛ  
minQVΛ  
maxQVΛ  
 
 
 
Submatrices of matrix Λ  
rλ  Nodal price vector for reference bus 
sVCPi,λ  Part of nodal price congestion component of active power at bus i due to voltage congestion at bus s 
µ Vector of Lagrange multipliers of voltage magnitude and line flow constrains 
iµ  The i-th element of µ 
Ljµ  Lagrange multiplier with respect to the power flow limit over the line j  
maxViµ  Lagrange multiplier with respect to the upper voltage magnitude limit at bus i  
minViµ  Lagrange multiplier with respect to the lower voltage magnitude limit at bus i  
ξ Lagrange multiplier for zonal pricing restriction 
π  Permutation 
σ  Vector of Lagrange multipliers of active and reactive generation constrains 
jσ  The j-th element of σ 
τ Vector of active and reactive power 
)(viϕ  Shapley value 
AΨ  Set of lines supplying bus A 
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)(viψ  Solidarity value 
Ω  Set of usage based methods 
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(Some) Hellenic words 
 
 
 
Acriby accuracy 
Brachychronic Short term 
Pandemic Universal 
Isonomy Equality of legal rights 
Idiosyncrasy Mental or physical peculiarity 
Dimerous Arranged or divided in two parts 
Epulosis Formation of scar 
Diorthosis Correction 
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